


























ISIS attacked Ramadi and Fallujah in the early days of January 2014, and while Fallujah fell 
at once with no visible resistance, it took protracted fighting and a three-day surge by ISIS 
before Ramadi fell on May 17 the same year.	Through the application of social movement 
theory to the cases, I argue that it is possible to provide an understanding of the processes that 
led up to the two different outcomes, by looking at the Sunni Protest movement in Anbar 
throughout 2013. I argue that to understand the rise of ISIS, it is important to look beyond the 
group itself. It is necessary to include environmental dynamics, intramovement relations and 
the influence of outside actors in the analysis.	
	
This study finds that internal competition of frames caused Ramadi and Fallujah to develop 
differently. Fallujah was more receptive to extremist frames, while moderate frames resonated 
best in Ramadi. State repression and violence confirmed the dominant and extreme frames in 
Fallujah perfectly. The repression also affected Ramadi negatively, but not as much as in 
Fallujah. The radical flank effect increased the difference by affecting how the government 
handled the movement in general and how the government handled the cities specifically.  
 
As the Iraqi security forces pulled away from the cities after clashing with protesters in late 
December, the local councils inserted themselves as the governing bodies of Ramadi and 
Fallujah. Because Ramadi had remained relatively moderate, it was not in its interest to 
cooperate with ISIS, thus siding with the Iraqi security forces in fighting the extremists. 
Fallujah, on the other hand, which had been increasingly radicalised throughout the year, had 
no problem cooperating with ISIS. Fallujah let ISIS into the city, and that is why ISIS was 
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AQI: al-Qaida Iraq 
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“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times […]” (Dickens, 1949) 
 
There was careful optimism at the beginning of 2013. Large parts of the Sunni community in 
Iraq had united around a common cause: Less governmental influence in the Sunni cities. No 
more discrimination. Protest sites were established in major Sunni cities and the Sunni Protest 
movement held demonstrations all over the country. However, as the protests intensified 
throughout 2013, violence became widespread and the Government of Iraq’s handling of the 
situation became more and more heavy-handed. By the end of the year, one of the cities was 
still controlled by a faction loyal to the government. The other had descended into insurgency, 
in the hands of a faction willing to cooperate even with the most extreme group of all: ISIS. 
 
The group I refer to as ISIS in this thesis has changed its name several times, along with its 
goals, geographic focus and organisational affiliation. Other names are the Islamic State in 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State (IS) or Daesh. The latter is a derogatory term from 
the group’s Arabic acronym (Stern and Berger, 2016). When I refer to other groups, I will use 
the names most commonly used in Western media.  
 
Even though ISIS has been set back militarily over the last years and the flow of foreign 
fighters has decreased, it is unlikely that the group will be completely defeated in the near 
term. It will survive in one form or another, and according to NIS (2017), they are trying to 
create a base or conditions that will facilitate the rebuilding of the movement like they did 
when the Americans left Iraq in 2011. 
 
ISIS attacked Ramadi and Fallujah in the early days of January 2014, and while Fallujah fell 
at once with no visible resistance, it took protracted fighting and a three-day surge by ISIS 
before Ramadi fell on May 17 the same year (Sowell, 2015). The current understanding is that 
the rise of ISIS in general, and the movement’s success in Eastern Anbar, largely can be 
explained by a) the Sunni – Shia conflict, assuming that the Sunni population automatically 
sided with ISIS when faced by Shia dominated security forces, or b) ISIS’ superior military 
power. Some also argue that ISIS was able to exploit the grievances in the Sunni population 
towards the repressive regime of Iraq’s prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki (BBC, 2014a). 
However, none of these explains why ISIS was able to move straight into Fallujah without 
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resistance, while being rejected and defeated in Ramadi. The aim of this thesis is thus to 
answer the following question: why was ISIS able to enter Fallujah unopposed, while being 
rejected and defeated in Ramadi in January 2014? 
 
Through the application of social movement theory (SMT) to the cases, I argue that it is 
possible to provide an understanding of the processes that led up to the two different 
outcomes, by looking at the context in Anbar throughout 2013. I argue that to understand the 
rise of ISIS, it is important to look beyond the group itself. By looking at the Sunni Protest 
movement as a social movement, it is possible to include environmental dynamics, 
intramovement relations and the influence of outside actors in the analysis, and this is 
important in understanding ISIS. But, before I get ahead of myself, I will have to give a short 
overview of how this study is constructed. 
 
The first three chapters include a literature review, a chapter on the methodological issues and 
an introduction to social movement theory. These three chapters provide an understanding of 
how this study is situated in the literature and how it contributes to the current body of 
knowledge. I outline how the study is conducted and how I have made sure that it holds 
water. Lastly, the chapter on social movement theory explains how I apply the theory as well 
as describing its usefulness in this study. From the theory chapter, I am moving on to the 
analysis. 
 
The last three chapters is the analysis. First, I conduct two separate case studies of Ramadi 
and Fallujah respectively, where I provide an understanding of how the two cities developed 
throughout 2013. Secondly, I conduct a cross-case analysis, trying to compare the two cities 
and point out why the outcome was so different. 
 
ISIS has fascinated me for quite some time. Their brutality and lightning campaign in June 
2014 surpasses fiction, and they have achieved unprecedented levels of media attention. 
Needless to say, a lot has been written about ISIS before. In order to find some aspect that had 
not already been covered, I conducted a thorough literature review of what had been written 




The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the existing literature on ISIS. Because of 
the vast amount of publications on the topic, I will focus on the most important ones and 
highlight how these authors have covered different aspects of ISIS. I will then look at how a 
few scholars have used social movement theory to analyse ISIS. At the end of this chapter I 
present some perspectives and explanations on the outcome of ISIS approach in Ramadi and 
Fallujah. Through an increasingly focused literature review, from ISIS in general to ISIS in 
Ramadi and Fallujah specifically, I will highlight a gap in the existing body of knowledge, 
and my research question follows as a natural consequence of this gap. 
 
Literature	describing	limited	and	specific	aspects	of	ISIS		
Ali (2015) looks specifically at propaganda and the recruitment of women, while Berger 
(2015) and Atwan (2015) describes ISIS’ various recruitment strategies through social media. 
Stern and Berger (2016:XX) describes a propaganda video released in May 2014 showing the 
execution of unarmed Iraqi soldiers as “[…] possibly the most popular jihadist propaganda 
video of all time.”. Violence has been an important factor in ISIS’ recruitment of local and 
foreign fighters (Byman, 2016:143). The issue of foreign fighters in general is described by 
Stern and Berger (2016), McCants (2015) and Fishman (2016), while Arntsen (2016) made an 
important contribution with his book about the recruitment of Norwegian foreign fighters in 
specific. 
 
McCants (2015) focuses on the apocalyptic aspect of ISIS and how it influences recruitment. 
The apocalypse is central to ISIS as a recruitment tool, portraying their fighters as defenders 
of the righteous (Byman, 2016:137). Whereas Al-Qaida downplayed the apocalyptic 
narrative, ISIS embraces the idea that they are currently fighting the unbelievers in the end of 
times (McCants, 2015). The apocalyptic narratives are also central in the propaganda, as they 
[…] resonate among many Muslims today because of the political turmoil in the Middle 
East.” (McCants, 2015:461).  
 
The ideological aspect of ISIS is described by Byman (2016). While ISIS is highly 
ideological, the movement is still pragmatic and the ideology subordinate to strategic goals 
(Byman, 2016). This makes the ideology seem incoherent and contradictory, and as a 
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consequence, predicting ISIS’ actions from their ideology is very difficult (Byman, 
2016:136). Still, Byman (2016) also views ISIS in terms of agency by looking at strengths 




The literature describing the rise of ISIS does so mostly in a historical context and with the 
Sunni- Shia conflict as the main explanation for its rise. Authors such as Weiss and Hassan 
(2015) and McCants (2015) argue that ISIS attacked the Shia population to escalate existing 
tensions and provoke a violent response against the Sunni community. The aim was to drag 
Iraq into a sectarian conflict. This way, the Sunni population would assess that their best 
chance of protection from Shia security forces would be to align with ISIS. 
 
The Sunni - Shia conflict is very important in understanding the rise of ISIS. However, if used 
as the main explanation, it suggests that the course of events in Ramadi and Fallujah should 
have been quite similar, as both cities are Sunni-dominated. ISIS attacked both cities in the 
early days of January 2014, and while Fallujah fell at once with no visible resistance, it took 
protracted fighting and finally, a three-day surge by ISIS before Ramadi fell on May 17 the 
same year (Sowell, 2015). A purely military explanation, that Fallujah was somehow weaker 
and easier to target, seems less plausible. ISIS had 300 to 500 men in Fallujah (Cockburn, 
2015, Abbas, 2014a), a city of 320 000+ inhabitants (PopulationData, 2015) and a history of 
strong resistance to hostile invaders (International Crisis Group, 2014, Sowell, 2015). Abbas 
(2014a) also points out that “Tribal gunmen surrounded the al-Qaeda gunmen as soon as they 
arrived.” Armed tribal militias reside in and around both Ramadi and Fallujah, and in Ramadi 
the outcome shows that ISIS was an inferior force. ISIS would become a well-armed and 
equipped force, but this did not happen until it seized large amounts of heavy and modern 
equipment from the Iraqi army in May-June 2014 (Terrill, 2014). The point is that both 
Ramadi and Fallujah would have been able to withstand an attack by ISIS, which indicates 
that the outcome was the result of something else. 
 
ISIS	strategy	
Many of the publications on ISIS have been written by experts on counterinsurgency (COIN) 
or other security studies. This is not surprising, as the United States considered Al-Qaida in 
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Iraq (AQI), ISIS’ predecessor, to be a military opponent and fought a counter insurgency 
campaign against them for several years. Thus, military theorists became authoritative on how 
to deal with ISIS. However, this has caused the focal point of analysis to be ISIS as an 
organisation, studying issues such as strategy and military action. Brian Fishman’s book “The 
Masterplan: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory” (2016) serves as a 
good illustration of this. Researchers like Knights (2014) and Ryan (2015) also focus on ISIS 
as a military-like organisation in a military-strategic perspective. They conclude that ISIS 
strategy is decisive in their success. However, analysing ISIS detached from the local context, 
existing structures and political opportunities fails explain how ISIS could persuade and 
recruit as many fighters needed to take military control in Fallujah. 
	
ISIS	in	Ramadi	and	Fallujah	
Cockburn (2015) mentions that ISIS seized Fallujah and large parts of Anbar, while he in 
another book mentions ISIS being in control of Fallujah, but does not address the difference 
between the cities (Cockburn, 2016). Weiss and Hassan (2015) point out that both cities fell 
to ISIS and underline how much longer it took to take Ramadi. The book argues that 
discontent about Maliki’s heavy-handed policies and the use of Shia militias ignited a Sunni 
insurgency that gave ISIS an opening. This explanation takes political opportunity into 
account, but does not explain the differences in Fallujah and Ramadi. 
 
Knights (2014) looks at the different outcomes in Ramadi and Fallujah, and points to 
Fallujah’s history as a rebellious and insular city. In Ramadi’s case, he is arguing that the 
tribes in Ramadi rejected AQI to a larger degree than the ones in Fallujah, thus making 
Ramadi less susceptible to ISIS than Fallujah. Griffin (2016) argues similarly that the tribal 
authorities in Ramadi may have feared reprisals because of their participation in the 
Awakening, a popular Sunni uprising against ISI, ISIS predecessor, in late 2006. However, 
neither of these explanations are sufficient because the tribes were considerably stronger than 
ISIS in late 2013 and early 2014, and ISIS did not pose a military threat, although they did 
conduct several assassinations. The argument of Fallujah as an insular city is partly right, but 
it does not explain why ISIS seized the city at the time it did. Fallujah has always been an 




Ryan (2015) uses social movement theory to present a net assessment of ISIS strengths and 
weaknesses. He provides insight into ISIS’ framing of issues, how the movement manages 
political contention and how it builds networks. However, the focus is still on the movement 
and how it influences its environment. By leaving out political opportunity, the case study 
fails to address how political environment, mobilising structures and frames influence the 
development of ISIS.  
 
Pelletier, Gardner, Ligon and Kilinc (2016) use social movement theory to analyse ISIS 
propaganda. Their aim is to investigate how ISIS uses Islamic Law to support strategic 
objectives. They find that ISIS frame messaging to strengthen areas where its strategy is 
consistent with mainstream Islamic Law, use existing contradictions in Islamic Law in ISIS’ 
favour and reinterpret Islamic Law to mobilise the target audience. The study provides a 
conceptual framework for analysing ISIS framing in general, but does not take into account 




There are a few articles that describe ISIS in the context of the Sunni Protest movement that 
dominated the political landscape in Anbar throughout 2013. One of these is Sowell’s Iraq’s 
Second Sunni Insurgency. The article looks at the failure of the Maliki government in 
addressing political grievances and how religious, political and tribal factions take advantage 
of this situation to strengthen their own cause in Anbar. Further, violent events and repressive 
government actions deepens the divide, cements the struggle as sectarian, and Sowell argues 
that nationalist insurgents takes advantage of this to reignite a full-fledged insurgency. The 
article describes how the Sunni Protest movement was radicalised throughout 2013, and 
provides a more nuanced assessment of ISIS influence in Fallujah by the beginning of 
January 2014. Sowell provides a good description of the context in Anbar throughout 2013 
and a historic account of the events. My study further contributes by using social movement 
theory to explain mobilisation and radicalisation of Fallujah, while Ramadi mobilises around 
moderate groups and structures. 
 
The article Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and the State by International Crisis Group was 
written in August 2013 and, like Sowell’s Iraq’s Second Sunni Insurgency, it describes how 
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the Sunni Protest movement is radicalised through events in early 2013. It gives a good 
overview of the participants in the Sunni Protest movement and their bases of support. The 
article argues that the repressive policies of Maliki have caused a renewed spiral of violence 
and that this probably will continue towards the 2014 parliamentary elections. This turned out 
to be correct. The article also makes a point that is central to this thesis, namely that the 
increased radicalisation and internal conflicts of the movement were used by Maliki to justify 
the government’s repressive strategy. However, as the article was published in August 2013, 
it does not explain just how differently the situations in Ramadi and Fallujah would evolve 
towards the end of the year. 
 
There are many authors that have been cited so far and most of them have on thing in 
common; they focus directly on ISIS. Sowell’s article Iraq’s Second Sunni Insurgency is one 
of the few scholarly works that mainly focuses on the context in Anbar when ISIS resurfaced. 
He describes the Sunni protests as a movement, but does not apply social movement theory to 
analyse how the movement evolves. Sowell leaves out how ISIS worked to shape their own 
opportunities through action and framing of issues, and this is a weakness. Still, his article is 
central to this study, as it provides excellent insight into the political landscape at the time. He 
also provides interesting details about the dynamics between the Ramadi and Fallujah protest 
sites in an interview with Joel Wing, editor of the blog Musings on Iraq.  
 
The scholars referenced in this chapter provide explanations for the rise of ISIS in a historic 
context and the group’s strategy, in addition to looking at ideology, recruitment and use of 
social media. Some also point to possible explanations for the different outcomes in Fallujah 
and Ramadi. My study will contribute to the body of knowledge by analysing the cities using 
social movement theory, as opposed to a purely historic account of the events. Through the 
review of different publications it has become increasingly clear that it is necessary to provide 
a nuanced explanation for the outcome of ISIS’ approach in Ramadi and Fallujah. I argue that 
studying these two cities is an important contribution to the current body of knowledge, 
because Fallujah was the first large city ISIS took control of, and central in their campaign to 
take control in Anbar province. Thus, the research question this thesis is trying to answer is: 
why was ISIS able to enter Fallujah unopposed, while being rejected and defeated in Ramadi 





The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodological choices that have 
been made in order to answer the research question. This includes the choice of the case study 
method and why it is suited to provide insight in this study. Additionally, I will point out 
issues tied to the validity of the study, as well as the use of sources and other potential pitfalls. 
But before moving into any of that, I think it is essential to be clear about what the purpose of 
this study is. 
 
Purpose	
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the current body of knowledge on the rise of ISIS 
in Anbar, by explaining how ISIS was able to enter Fallujah unopposed, while being rejected 
and defeated in Ramadi in January 2014. The current understanding is that ISIS’ success in 
Eastern Anbar mainly can be explained by a) the Sunni – Shiite conflict, assuming that the 
Sunni population automatically sided with ISIS when faced by Shiite dominated security 
forces, b) ISIS’ superior military power, or c) that ISIS took advantage of, and rose, from the 
aggrieved Sunni Protest movement, a conflict that developed in Anbar throughout 2013. 
However, none of the explanations provide an understanding as to why the outcome was so 
different in the two cities.  
 
I argue that a combination of the environment, other groups involved, ISIS’ own strategic 
choices and the actions of the Iraqi government, are central in explaining this difference. To 
shed light on these dynamics, I argue that it is useful to analyse the outcomes using social 
movement theory because it provides a methodological middle ground between structural and 
rational choice models (Robinson, 2004:117). This is relevant in this analysis, because ISIS 
needs to be understood not just in terms of its own strategy and actions, but also how the 
environment shapes and influences ISIS. 
 
Research	design	
My research design is based on the case study method. I will conduct a comparative study of 
two cases, including within-case analysis guided by the framework I outline in the chapter on 
social movement theory. According to (George and Bennett, 2005:20), there is an increasing 
consensus that the “[…] strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of 
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a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study […]”. 
The first case is how the situation in Ramadi developed throughout 2013 and into the first 
days of January 2014 when militants attacked the city. The second case is how the situation 
developed throughout 2013 in Fallujah and the reaction in the city when ISIS arrived in early 
January 2014.  
 
The two cities are located in Eastern Anbar along the Euphrates river, in an area considered 
the sectarian borderland between the Sunni Arab world and Shia Arab Iraq, backed by Shia 
Persian Iran (Sowell, 2015). Ramadi is the provincial capital, located about 100 km West of 
Baghdad, while Fallujah is considered the second city, located about halfway between 
Baghdad and Ramadi (see appendix A: Map of Iraq). What makes these cases interesting is 
that even though the cities have a lot in common, the events unfolded differently when ISIS 
approached them in January 2014; in Ramadi, the local militias sided with the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) in the fight against ISIS. While in Fallujah, ISIS was let into the city and 
cooperated with local militias in the fight against ISF. When looking closer at these cases, it 
becomes clear that an exclusively sectarian or military explanation for ISIS success in 
Fallujah seems incomplete. Before getting further into the details, I will look at some of the 
key concepts of the research methodology I have chosen; the case study. 
 
The	Case	study	
A “case” is the main subject of analysis in a case study, and defined by (Gerring, 2007a:19) as 
a “[…] spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over 
some period of time.”. It is usually easier to define the spatial boundaries of a case, such as a 
nation’s borders, than the temporal boundaries (Gerring, 2007a:19). Still, in some instances 
such as a terrorist attack, deciding spatial boundaries can be difficult (Gerring, 2007a:20). 
Units can vary in size from individuals to nation-states, depending on what the study aims to 
illuminate (Gerring, 2007a). The cases in this study were not chosen randomly as 
representative of a population of cases, but by purposive sampling because they have different 
outcomes. Spatially, the cases are limited to the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. The period of 
time under investigation in this study is from early 2013 to early January 2014. ISIS moves on 
both cities in the first days of January 2014, after yearlong Sunni demonstrations in large 
parts of Anbar escalate violently and cause government controlled security forces to leave 
Ramadi and Fallujah to the tribes and local militias.  
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The definition of a case study is two-fold according to Yin (2014:16), covering both the scope 
and features of a case study. First, he points out that a case study can be defined as “[…] an 
empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-
world context” (Yin, 2014:16). The intense study of one or a few cases is central to the 
understanding of the case study methodology (Gerring, 2007a). The method is particularly 
useful when trying to answer a research question beginning with “how” or “why”, as these 
questions are largely explanatory and “[…] deal with operational links needing to be traced 
over time […]” (Yin, 2014:10). The case study rests on an assumption that there is a link 
between micro and macro level in social behaviour (Gerring, 2007a:1).  
 
Secondly, the case study handles a specific situation with many variables that makes it 
necessary to utilise a wide selection of sources and to develop theoretical propositions to 
guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2014:17). When looking at many sources it is 
important triangulate; to converge the data to determine the consistency of a finding (Yin, 
2014:17). Developing converging lines of inquiry through the use of multiple sources makes a 
finding or conclusion more likely to be accurate (Yin, 2014:120).  
 
Yin (2014) points out that case study methodology is especially suitable when it is hard to 
separate the phenomenon from the context. That is very relevant in the two cases in this 
study. ISIS’ attack on Ramadi and Fallujah respectively happens in the context of rising 
tension and violence in Eastern Anbar, with several other groups manoeuvring the political 
and security domain simultaneously. Through Yin’s definition of a case study and by using 
SMT, the study looks at both context and agency to explain the different outcomes in the two 
cases.  
 
Even though Yin’s definition of a case study implies a contemporary focus, it is also possible 
to conduct a case study of historic events, as the method actually relies on many of the same 
techniques (Yin, 2014). A history relies on primary and secondary documents, artefacts and 
other historic sources, that also can be used in case studies (Yin, 2014). What sets them apart 
is not the method itself, but rather the nature of the sources being used, as case study also can 
rely on direct observation of the phenomenon and interviews of persons involved (Yin, 2014). 
This is also possible with fairly recent historic events, and creates an overlap between a 
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history and a case study (Yin, 2014). My study belongs in the overlapping sphere between the 
two, as I will rely on a wide selection of documents. 
 
Case study research can incorporate one (single case study) or several cases (multiple case 
study) (Yin, 2014:50). If there are so many cases that it is no longer possible to study them 
intensively, the focus shifts to a sample of cases (cross-case study or large-N study) (Gerring, 
2007a). There is no specific number that signifies that the study has moved to a cross-case 
and it is better understood as a continuum, according to (Gerring, 2007a:20). I will look at 
two cases, placing my study firmly in the end of the continuum where it is possible to study 
the cases intensively. Conclusions drawn across multiple cases also makes the study more 
robust, compared to conclusions from a single case (Yin, 2014:57).  
 
The case study research design has faced a lot of criticism and is viewed by many with “[…] 
extreme circumspection.” according to (Gerring, 2007a:6). Nonreplicability, informal and 
undisciplined research design, biased case selection, nongeneralizable theories and subjective 
conclusions are among the main critiques (Gerring, 2007a:6). However, it is important to not 
mistake poorly implemented case study methods for a faulty methodology (George and 
Bennett, 2005:22). Case study research, like other research methods, has its strengths and 
limitations. It is important to understand the trade-offs and potential pitfalls, and not regard 
the case study as […] a license to do whatever a researcher wishes to do with a chosen topic.” 
(Gerring, 2007a:6). 
 
When discussing the strengths and limitations of the case study method, it is useful to 
contextualise by looking at certain key expressions. Internal validity is defined by Yin 
(2014:239) as the strength of a cause-effect link, in part determined by showing the absence 
of spurious relationships (events that wrongly seem to be causally related) and the rejection of 
rival hypotheses. External validity is “the extent to which the findings from a case study can 
be analytically generalized to other situations that were not part of the original study” (Yin, 
2014:238). 
 
Historically, the definition of case studies rested on the small number of phenomena being 
investigated, “small-n”, as opposed to a statistical research design with a quantitative focus, 
“large-N” (George and Bennett, 2005:17). The strengths and limitations of case study 
research can be understood relative to large-N studies (Gerring, 2007a:37). Case studies are 
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usually limited to a dozen cases or less for practical reasons (Gerring, 2007b:96). As a case 
study includes only a small number of cases, the possibility to generalize the findings to a 
larger population is limited (Gerring, 2007a:43). The external validity of a case study is thus 
weaker than that of a large-N study. However, the internal validity is stronger in a study with 
few cases, because each case is studied more intensively and this often makes it easier to 
establish the truthfulness of a causal relationship within the case (Gerring, 2007a:43).  
 
According to Gerring (2007a:12) the strongest defence of case studies is that they are quasi-
experimental in nature, as the experiment relies on a small number of “cases” that are closely 
related and observed at a single point or over time. In an experiment the researcher is able to 
control the environment and the variables, but it still resembles a case study more closely than 
a large study with many units (Gerring, 2007a). In this study, the two cases can be viewed as 
the experiments. In both cases, ISIS tries to take territorial control over a Sunni-dominated 
city, and while the approaches to the cities are the same, the outcomes are very different. 
 
Generalization is not achieved through a single experiment, but by experiments conducted 
several times, replicating the phenomenon under different circumstances (Yin, 2014:20). This 
approach can also be used to understand case studies, as the findings are not representative for 
a larger population, but can be generalizable to theoretical propositions (Yin, 2014:21). This 
means that there is no statistical proof that the results are valid in another part of the 
population, but that results through analytic generalization can be logically extended to other 
situations “[…] based on the relevance of similar theoretical concepts and principles.” (Yin, 
2014:237). This study includes just two cases, which limits the possibilities of extending the 
results to other situations not included in the study, the external validity.  
 
Reliability is the possibility that other researchers can repeat the study with the same result 
(Yin, 2014:46). This is maintained through a complete bibliography and use of citations, a 
thorough description of the research study design and theoretical framework, and maintaining 
a chain of evidence that enables the external observer to logically link collection, evidence 
and conclusions (Yin, 2014:127). 
 
Sources	
Most of the sources that I have used in this study have been collected from the Internet. It 
would not have been possible to conduct this study without extensive use of online resources. 
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When using the Internet it is very important to be critical, and spend time investigating and 
evaluating the credibility of the sources, as well as the validity of the information they 
provided. At the same time, the Internet provides an amazing access to resources and 
information that has made this study possible. 
 
I have used the blog by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi (2014a) and Joel Wing’s “Musings on 
Iraq” (2008) extensively throughout the study. They provide detailed knowledge about the 
events, overview over the groups involved and the relations between them. Wing and Tamimi 
both rely on their wide networks in Iraq and have conducted interviews with several of the 
insurgent leaders relevant to shed light on the events in Ramadi and Fallujah. Both blogs are 
cited extensively in newspapers, journal articles and books, and are considered reliable. 
However, it is important to stay critical and confirm the information through other sources as 
well where this is possible. Additionally, blog posts are not updated at a later point. This 
means that old blog posts can contain errors from the contemporary understanding of events 
that have been rejected later. 
 
Information was spread in several ways during the protests. The most important sources of 
information were the Mosques, outdoor sermons, demonstrations and flyers that were 
distributed at the protest sites. Additionally, social media and conventional media, like 
newspapers and TV, contributed to spreading the information. I have used some 
contemporary electronic newspaper articles in my study. When it comes to the sermons, 
demonstrations, flyers, social media and TV-sources, I have not used any directly, but through 
secondary sources.  
 
The Government of Iraq (GOI) denied journalists and diplomats access to Fallujah, thus, no 
international media has been able to report from the city (International Crisis Group, 2014:3). 
When trying to reach Fallujah, a BBC reporter told International Crisis Group that “[…] an 
Iraqi army convoy blocked us at the entrance of Anbar province.” (International Crisis Group, 
2014:3). Several bloggers and journalists conducted telephone interviews with eyewitnesses 
inside Fallujah. This has contributed greatly to my understanding of the events, but required 
triangulation with other sources. 
 
An important newspaper article, “Four armed groups fighting in Fallujah” (Abbas, 2014a), 
provides detailed information from inside Fallujah after non-governmental armed forces have 
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taken control. This article is based on an interview with an anonymous member of the Tribal 
Revolutionaries’ Council, one of the armed groups active in Fallujah. Abbas, the author, has 
written several articles on events in Iraq and Anbar, and if often cited in journal articles. Like 
Wing and Tamimi, he also has an extensive network in Iraq that provides highly detailed 
information. Some of these sources are described in terms of position or function, but most 
often they remain anonymous.  
 
International Crisis Group (ICG) has written several reports on Iraq and the Sunni repression. 
Their analysts have conducted several interviews inside Iraq, and ICG relies less on secondary 
sources than most other foundations or think tanks. This makes their articles detailed and 
providing perspectives from civilians in the areas the events are taking place. With the blogs, 
journal articles and newspaper articles, it is possible to piece together a relatively detailed and 
(hopefully) accurate picture of what happened in Ramadi and Fallujah. 
 
Conducting research on a geographic area in conflict creates several challenges. First of all, 
limited access to the area restricts the possibilities of direct observation and to conduct 
interviews with subjects who witnessed the phenomenon in question. Secondly, a highly 
violent and rapidly evolving situation such as an attack is in its very nature difficult to get a 
complete and coherent overview of.  
 
Several of the groups involved in the Sunni Protest movement were violent, anti-
governmental groups trying to obtain territorial control through various means, at the cost of 
the Iraqi government. In such an endeavour, secrecy is for obvious reasons essential. This 
means that most of the primary sources contain information that the groups wanted to share, 
propaganda. Other primary sources have been obtained through military raids and other forms 
of intelligence collection. Some of these have been made available to the public by 
institutions such as Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. 
 
The Sunni Protest movement’s propaganda is conveyed through different means and in 
different languages. The propaganda used in this study is in English, either because it has 
been translated or because it was released it in English. As I am not an Arabic speaker, 
translated propaganda limits my ability to verify the information it contains. I have tried to 
use sources referenced by other scholars as much as possible to reduce the chance of 
misinterpreting the source. However, by relying on sources in English, I have been using the 
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same sources available to every other English-speaking scholar, thus possibly making the 
same mistakes as others before me and strengthening misconceptions. 
 
The propaganda released in English suggests that it was meant for “the English-speaking 
world” and not necessarily for the inhabitants of Fallujah and Ramadi. This poses a validity 
challenge, as this information is obviously meant to portray the Sunni Protest movement, as it 
wants to be seen by the “outside” world. Thus, propaganda, and especially propaganda that 
has been released in English, can mainly be used as background information, to highlight 
different aspects such as ideology and narratives, and to build timelines. In all instances, the 
information must be checked against other sources. 
 
Secondary sources, like academic articles and newspaper articles, face the same challenges 
regarding primary sources as described above. Additionally, journalists do not always reveal 
their sources, which makes it hard to verify the information and avoid circular reporting. 
Circular reporting occurs when information seems to come from several sources, but in reality 
only comes from one. Triangulation with circular reporting creates findings that seem 
methodologically strong, when they in reality are not. The source a journalist uses can also be 
biased, trying to establish a narrative that is positive for the tribe or other unity when they 
know their story will be conveyed to a large audience. Additionally, journalists often work on 
a tight schedule and in competition with other media. This time pressure can cause bias and 
factual errors in the reporting. 
 
When using information provided by the state of Iraq, it is equally important to be aware of 
possible biases, exaggeration of success and underreporting of negative events. A solution to 
this could be to use secondary sources representing different parties to the conflict, like 
statements from the protesters, protest leaders and reports from independent observers such as 
Human Rights organisations. 
 
With regards to sources, it is a weakness to my study that I have only used secondary sources. 
It would have been a strength to my study if I had been able to conduct my own interviews 
and study sources in their original language. However, this has not been possible because of 
limited time and language skills. Additionally, many of the sources have been collected from 
the Internet, with all its potential pitfalls. As a result, I have spent much time investigating the 




The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of what a social movement is, its 
characteristics and why social movement theory is useful in showing how ISIS could take 
territorial control in Fallujah, through analysing how the Sunni Protest movement in 2013 
evolved. Secondly, this chapter aims to provide the framework for the analysis by describing 
the political process model and the three dimensions political opportunity, mobilising 
structures and framing processes, and how these relate to each other. 
 
The	synthetic	model	
The idea of social movements as distinctive forms of political action is nothing new and can 
be traced as far back as the 1760s (Tilly, 2009:533). However, the research field became 
increasingly relevant in the 60s and 70s when the American civil rights movement, the 
women’s rights movement and other forms of collective action and protest movements gained 
traction (della Porta and Diani, 1999:2). These movements increased the need to understand 
this new form of collective action of societal and political participation (della Porta and Diani, 
1999:2). As the actors in the new conflicts were people who had taken little or no part in 
traditional politics (youth, women and the coloured) della Porta and Diani (1999) argue that it 
was difficult to understand them in the context of traditional political cleavages in an 
industrial society. Additionally, the principal frameworks for analysing social conflict at the 
time, Marxism and structural-functionalism, were unable to explain the revival of the biggest 
collective mobilisations since the 1930s. As a response to this, several perspectives on the 
analysis of social movements emerged, such as collective behaviour, resource mobilisation, 
new social movements, and political process model (della Porta and Diani, 1999:3). 
 
The key assumption in collective behaviour theory is that structural changes lead to 
psychological discomfort, which in turn causes collective action (Wiktorowicz, 2004:6). By 
assuming a linear, causal relationship, this approach was unable to explain why movements 
would rise in specific situations (Wiktorowicz, 2004:6). Resource mobilisation theory 
emerged as a response to this shortcoming, assuming that movements are rational, providing a 
structure for aggrieved individuals and providing resources for collective action 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004:10). New social movements would introduce the cultural factors of 
identity, framing and emotion to the field of SMT (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007:445). Framing had 
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largely been absorbed in the political process model by the end of the 1990s, and made the 
model less structurally focused (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007:445).  
 
Morris criticises the political process model for being “[…] overly structural and contain[ing] 
rationalistic biases.” (2000). He argues that the model’s focus on external forces is its biggest 
limitation, and that it underestimates a group’s capacity to generate collective action, even as 
political authorities unleashes heavy repression (Morris, 2000:3). Still, this model has become 
the dominant synthetic model within SMT (Morris, 2000). Theorists central in developing the 
political process model claim that these elements together “[…] account for movement 
origins, the power generated by movements, the energizing cultural content of movements, 
and movement outcomes” (Morris, 2000). 
 
Definition	
A social movement is defined by Gamson and Meyer (1996:283) as a: 
“[…] sustained and self-conscious challenge to authorities or cultural codes by a field 
of actors (organizations and advocacy networks), some of whom employ 
extrainstitutional means of influence.” 
 
Gamson and Meyer’s definition highlights two aspects that are central to this study; that a 
movement consists of several actors and that these actors can pursue different strategies 
through different means. 
 
Adding to the definition provided by Gamson and Meyer, della Porta and Diani (1999) argue 
that social movements are defined by four characteristics; informal networks, based on shared 
beliefs and solidarity, which mobilise about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of 
various forms of protest. Informal networks understood as the interaction between a network 
of networks, organizations and/or individuals is the basis of social movement. By creating and 
distributing resources, information and ideas, these networks facilitate mobilisation (della 
Porta and Diani, 1999:14). Secondly, shared beliefs and solidarity creates a sense of 
belonging needed in a social movement (della Porta and Diani, 1999:14). This creates the 
“[…] existence of a vocabulary and an opening of ideas and actions, which in the past was 
either unknown or unthinkable.” Gusfield in della Porta and Diani (1999:14). The third trait is 
collective action focusing on conflicts of a social movement. It is the condition when the 
aforementioned actors or networks engage in a political or cultural conflict to oppose or 
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promote social change (della Porta and Diani, 1999:14). The fourth and last part of the 
definition is the use of protests. This is what sets social movements apart from other social 
and political actors, as it utilizes public protest and unconventional means of participation, 
including violence (della Porta and Diani, 1999:15). 
 
I have chosen to include della Porta and Diani’s view on the characteristics of a social 
movement, because it underlines the importance of shared beliefs, or frames, and the 
development of these in order to mobilise collective action. Combined with the definition 
provided by Gamson and Meyer, this accounts for the aspects of a social movement that are 




The Sunni Protest movement fits the definition of a social movement for several reasons. 
Even though it is convenient to refer to the Sunni Protest movement, it actually consisted of a 
field of actors. It was not a general mass of aggrieved individuals who spontaneously took to 
the streets like a mob, but “[…] an outgrowth of a core division within the organized part of 
the Sunni community going back to 2003.” (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). On 
one side was the mainstream clerics, political parties and tribal leaders who had chosen to 
work within the established political institutions; on the other side, elements of the armed 
insurgency that lost the civil war from 2004 to 2007, who had survived and now resurfaced 
(Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013, International Crisis Group, 2013). 
 
This broad range of actors wanted to achieve different goals and thus followed different 
strategies, varying from moderate demands for Sunni influence in the political processes to 
overthrowing the central government and establishing a cross-national Caliphate under the 
rule of a supreme religious leader (Sowell, 2014, Wicken, 2013, International Crisis Group, 
2013). The different strategies also included different means, where mainstream political 
actors argued in favour of negotiations, peaceful protests and sit-ins, the clerics would hold 
encouraging speeches during Friday prayer, while the more extreme elements proposed and 
executed blackmail, violence and other acts of terror (International Crisis Group, 2013, 
Sowell, 2014, Wicken, 2013). 
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Authors such as Pelletier et al. (2016) and Ryan (2015) have analysed ISIS using SMT. 
However, when trying to explain how ISIS prevailed in Fallujah and not in Ramadi, it is not 
sufficient to look at just ISIS, their framing and the structural conditions. To understand how 
ISIS could gain enough support to take control in Fallujah, it is useful to look at mechanisms 
such as radical flank effect, different goals and competing frames. These mechanisms will be 
described in detail later in this chapter but what they all have in common, is that they can 
explain how a movement evolves, assuming the movement is made up by several actors 
pursing different goals. 
 
Relevance	of	SMT	
The Sunni Protests evolve from peaceful protests to an insurgency in the span of 12 months, 
causing jihadist groups to take territorial control over large urban areas. Social movement 
theory can contribute to understanding this development by providing a framework for the 
analysis of collective action and mobilisation. SMT is useful in showing how existing 
structures like tribes, political parties and criminal or insurgent networks can frame current 
issues and opportunities to gain support within an aggrieved population.  
 
SMT mostly uses groups as the unit in explaining collective action, because even though 
individuals make the choices, this happens does not happen in a vacuum (Robinson, 
2004:117). Meso-level groups, like informal networks or organisations are the vehicles 
through which people mobilise and are the “[…] collective building blocks of social 
movements and revolutions […]” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996:3). Structural changes 
are important in determining the success of a social movement, but they do not dictate the 
outcome (Robinson, 2004). 
 
This thesis is trying to explain why the outcomes in Ramadi and Fallujah were so different. In 
this regard, the comparative aspect of social movement theory, largely developed by 
European scholars, has shown that SMT is useful in analysing how the same movement 
develops under different structural conditions (McAdam et al., 1996). Even though the 
European approach mainly has analysed how the same movement develop in different 
countries with different structural and political systems, I argue that this approach is relevant. 
Throughout 2013, the governmental control over the two cities is reduced, and in late 
December, the security forces pull out. This causes two structurally different factions to take 
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control: the Anbar Coordination Committee in Ramadi and the Military Council of the Tribal 
Revolutionaries in Fallujah. 
 
How	SMT	can	be	used	to	study	violent	movements	
By looking at how SMT has evolved through the works of della Porta (1995) and 
Wiktorowicz (2004), I argue that SMT can be useful in analysing the Sunni Protest 
movement. Even though SMT was developed as a response to mostly peaceful protest 
movements in Europe and North America, della Porta shows how SMT can be used to study 
political violence and terrorism in her book Social movements, political violence, and the 
state: a comparative analysis of Italy and Germany (1995). Her work primarily opens up for 
applying SMT to highly violent movements, but still in a Westernised context.  
 
One of the most important contributors on social movement theory and Islamic activism is 
Wiktorowicz (2004) Islamic Activism – A social movement theory approach. He argues that 
Islamic activism can be considered a form of social movement, and that SMT is a useful 
framework for understanding Islamic activism, even though much of the SMT studies are 
dominated by research on the US and Western Europe. Wiktorowicz defines Islamic activism 
as “ […] the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes” (Wiktorowicz, 2004:2). 
He further states that the wide definition is a conscious choice, as it envelops a variety of 
movements, including “[…] terrorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and 
identities, [and] explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state […]” 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004:2). 
  
In the studies of Islamic activism there has been an inherent tendency to assume that 
grievances has been the most important driver behind mobilization, and that these grievances 
have been translated into religious symbols and idioms (Wiktorowicz, 2004:4). While various 
forms of grievances can play a part in mobilization, social movement theory researchers have 
shown that factors such as resource availability, framing resonance and changes in political 
opportunity structures are also linked to mobilization processes (Wiktorowicz, 2004:4). 
 
The	political	process	model	
First of all, the focus of this study is how one part of the Sunni Protest movement became 
dominant, not how the movement first emerged. My argument is that ISIS in Ramadi and 
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Fallujah did not emerge as a singular movement or arrive as an external group, but is the 
outcome of how the Sunni Protest movement developed through 2013. 
 
According to McAdam et al. (1996) there is an emerging consensus among researchers on 
social movements that three dimensions are central in analysing social movements. They are 
important both when a movement emerges and develop, but this study focuses on the latter. 
The three dimensions are:  
1. Political opportunities: the structure of political opportunities and constraints 
confronting the movement 
2. Mobilising structures: forms of organisation (informal as well as formal), available to 
insurgents 
3. Framing processes: the collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social 
construction that mediate between opportunity and action 
 
The political process model is the most relevant analytical framework in my study because it 
includes both structural and cultural factors, and how they relate to each other. The latter part 
is also the hardest, as there exists many relationships between the three dimensions, and the 
importance of these are determined by the research question (McAdam et al., 1996:7). 
Although the dimensions are the same, there are some nuances in how they are being utilised 
in the analysis and how they relate to each other (McAdam et al., 1996). 
 
When studying how and when a movement emerges, changes in the opportunity structure are 
important explanatory factors (McAdam et al., 1996:13). When explaining how a movement 
develops these changes are still relevant. However, as a movement has established itself and 
started to take action, the opportunities become, to a larger degree than before, the result of 
the movement’s interaction with its environment (McAdam et al., 1996).  
 
When looking at how a movement develops, the availability of mobilising structures is not the 
main focus, but rather the organisational profile of the groups involved in the movement 
(McAdam et al., 1996). In this study, these groups or structures, are the established political 
parties, former insurgent groups, mainstream religious groups and tribes that provided shelter, 
food and motivational speeches to the protesters. As the initial mobilisation is tied to 
established structures, new structures usually evolve to secure the sustainability of the 
movement; Social Movement Organisations (SMO) (McAdam et al., 1996). These groups are 
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specifically tied to the movement and become the main contestants within the movement as a 
whole. I argue that it is useful to analyse the main groups and the constellations they create at 
the different protest sites as SMOs within the Sunni Protest movement. In Ramadi the 
dominant groups create the Anbar Coordination Committee and in Fallujah the dominant 
groups create the Military Council of Tribal Revolutionaries. This will contribute to the 
understanding of how the movement evolved differently in the two cities, and how one of the 
SMOs could become so radical that it was willing to cooperate with ISIS, while the SMO in 
Ramadi supressed extremists and fought off ISIS. 
 
Political	opportunity	
The underlying assumption of political opportunity is that “[…] social movements and 
revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to 
the national context […]” (McAdam et al., 1996:3). Even though both European and 
American social movement scholars focused on the relationship between the institutionalised, 
political system, and social movements, two distinct directions within SMT developed. The 
American direction, trying to explain the emergence of a specific social movement by looking 
at changes in informal power relations or the structure of a political system (McAdam et al., 
1996:3). The European direction, also known as the new social movements tradition, trying to 
explain how different political systems influence how a social movement develops and its 
chances of success (McAdam et al., 1996:3). Several detailed historic accounts of single 
social movements have been produced by the American direction, while the European has 
added a comparative dimension to SMT by producing several studies on how the same 
movement has developed in different countries (McAdam et al., 1996). 
 
Tilly (1978) argues that political opportunity structures influence mobilization, defining 
opportunity structures as being composed of opportunities and constraints. In other words, 
political opportunity structures can motivate or demotivate, and make it easier or harder to 
succeed when collective action is taken. The structures can be the international system, 
regional dynamics, national politics or even structures within the group itself (Robinson, 
2004:116).  
 
According to Morris (2000), movements are likely to gain strength when favourable changes 
occur. These changes can be a weakening state control, civil war, emergence of external allies 
or foreign intervention, or any other opening of new space in the political system. However, a 
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strict interpretation of this makes the theory overly structural, as this leaves the movement at 
the mercy of the changing environment and dependent on exploiting changes that occur 
(Morris, 2000:3). To avoid loosing sight of human agency Morris (2000) argues that 
collective action also can create political opportunity and clear way for further collective 
action.  
 
McAdam (1996) identifies four dimensions in which the variables that determine political 
opportunity can be placed: 
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system 
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird 
a polity 
3. The presence or absence of elite allies 
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression 
	
In this study the focus will be on number four, as the development of the Sunni Protest 
movement throughout 2013 is highly influenced by events caused by the central 
government’s repressive strategy. The first three are related to the institutionalised political 
system, which was quite stable in this regard. There was little chance that a Sunni-dominated 
or very Sunni sympathetic party would sudden obtain power through the political process. 
 
Constant and essentially fixed aspects of political opportunity that are deeply embedded in 
culture or the political system are not very useful when trying to understand mobilisation and 
demobilisation, as these are highly dynamic processes (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:277-278). 
Thus, the focus in this study will be on the volatile aspects of political opportunity, like shifts 
in public policy, change in alliances, breakdown of social control, public discourse and 
national mood (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). The volatile aspects are central in explaining 
political opportunity, emphasizing the interaction between opportunities and movement 
strategy (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:277). This is central after a movement has emerged, 
because the  
“[…] structure of political opportunities is now more a product of the interaction of 
the movement with its environment than a simple reflection of changes recurring 




McAdam et al. (1996) argues that movements do not emerge spontaneously from the actions 
of marginal individuals in an unstructured context. Even though political and other 
institutionalised systems shape how and when social movements develop, this does not 
happen independent of the mobilising structures through which people organise (McAdam et 
al., 1996). Rather, movements exist and develop along the lines of existing organisations, 
institutions or informal networks, like ethnicities, tribes, political parties and even illegal 
organisations like criminal networks or terrorist groups (McAdam et al., 1996). The pre-
existing networks recruit, socialise, indoctrinate and mobilise contention (Robinson, 
2004:116). Further, if a movement is unable to allocate resources and direct collective action 
because of inappropriate organisational structures, it will lead to missed opportunities (Hafez, 
2004:40). Morris (2000) argues that mobilising structures are central to understanding 
movements, because this is where rational actors and human agency figure most prominently 
in the political process model.  
 
The radical flank effect 
Movements sometimes develop a radical flank. A group within the movement that utilises 
radical rhetoric and radical methods, compared to the rest of the movement (McAdam et al., 
1996). The radical flank effect is a dynamic within a movement and between a movement and 
a third party, in this case, the Government of Iraq. It can affect a movement in several ways, 
both positive and negative. The positive effect of a radical wing can be that the moderate part 
of the movement seems more reasonable and a more attractive party to negotiate with 
(McAdam et al., 1996). This way, the moderates are legitimised and bargaining position 
strengthened. McAdam et al. (1996) points out that funding the moderates is a way of 
undermining radical influence. 
 
The negative effects of the radical flank can pressure the moderates to take a more radical 
stand than first anticipated. Popular pressure to be seen as active and strong, intensified by the 
media attention a radical flank often gets, can cause a radicalisation of the entire movement. 
Additionally, the presence of a radical flank can undermined the movements a whole, 
reducing outside support and legitimising negative attention from media and authorities. 
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The radical flank effect is important in the cross-case analysis in this study, because Fallujah 
develops several traits throughout 2013 that makes it stand out as the radical flank of the 
Sunni Protest movement. 
 
Framing	processes	
Of the three dimensions in the political process model, framing processes is probably the least 
studied (McAdam et al., 1996). McAdam et al. (1996:6) argue that studying political 
opportunity and mobilising structures is “[…]inherently easier than trying to observe the 
social construction and dissemination of new ideas.”. Additionally, the lack of precision when 
defining framing processes may have contributed to limiting the efforts to study of this 
dimension (McAdam et al., 1996).  
 
To avoid confusing framing with any cultural aspect of a social movement, I will use the 
definition originally put forth by David Snow: 
“[…] the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared 
understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective 
action.” (McAdam et al., 1996). 
 
Additionally, this definition is useful as this study looks at movement development and 
outcomes. The actions of the different groups within the movement are more important in the 
developing stages, than when the movement emerges (McAdam et al., 1996). 
 
Every society has a shared set of histories, truths and symbols that make up what can be 
called a “cultural toolbox” (Robinson, 2004). These cultural tools are interpreted and utilized 
in different ways by different groups and movements, creating “[…] a set of contrasting 
ideologies and sets of meaning in any given society” (Robinson, 2004:116). The political 
process model maintains that collective action, including mass violence, involves “[…] 
normative framing to facilitate the mobilization of resources and motivate individuals to 
sacrifice their time, money, energy, and lives” (Hafez, 2004:39). 
 
Political opportunity and mobilising structures can only explain partly why and how social 
movements emerge, and does too little to account for human agency and culture (Gamson and 
Meyer, 1996). People’s perceptions and ideas of what is possible must necessarily be 
advantageous to and inspire to collective action for a movement to emerge (Gamson and 
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Meyer, 1996:283). Framing processes is a social construction within a movement that is 
necessary for it to take advantage opportunities, because “[a]n opportunity unrecognized is no 
opportunity at all.” (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:283). 
 
Because a movement is not one unified actor, it does not make sense to look at the framing 
processes as something the movement does itself, rather, the framing processes is the sum of 
all the different groups pursuing their different strategies and trying to rally support around 
their own frames (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Framing is an “[…] internal process of 
contention […] with different actors taking different positions.” (Gamson and Meyer, 
1996:283). This opens up for an internal debate in the movement about how opportunities are 
perceived and how to take advantage of them to create the best possible outcome (Gamson 
and Meyer, 1996). Through internal competition of frames among the social movement 
organisations, this process “[…] leads to changes in the dominant frames of a movement and 
a succession in [SMO] power and influence.” (Zald, 1996:270). 
 
Frames often focus on the promise of “[…] better policies, greater justice, and more human 
social life as alternatives which their actions can help bring about.” (Gamson and Meyer, 
1996:286). They are often exaggerated and overly optimistic with regards to the real 
opportunities and influence of the movement. They are convincing the participants of the 
realism in opportunities that are considered unrealistic to individuals outside the movement. 
Through mobilising collective action in accordance with the frame, a movement can create 
opportunities where there were none, “[…] making their opportunity frame a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.” (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:287). 
 
As the different actors in the movement follow different strategies, a normal conflict issue 
revolves around the means; whether to pursue the goals through institutional or 
extrainstitutional campaigns or actions (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:284). Gamson and Meyer 
(1996:284) calls this the “Worse is better” versus “Better is better” issue. Events are 
important drivers behind this debate, as they can reveal the movement’s chances of success, 
through election results, political concessions, political repression, or any kind of signal from 
formal or informal institutions. If the opportunities in the institutional sphere is closing, then 
it will be easier for proponents of extrainstitutional means to gain support within the 
movement for their frames (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Thus, the movement is also shaped by 
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how the mobilising structures or groups perceive the opportunities, and their relative chances 
of success through different kinds of actions.  
 
Theory	development	
As a part of the framing processes within a movement, social movement organisations 
become more or less dominant as a result of the internal competition of frames. Social 
movement organisations: 
 
“[…] engage in an intramovement contest over tactics and goals. This intramovement 
process leads to changes in the dominant frames of a movement and a succession in 
[SMO] power and influence.” (Zald, 1996:270). 
 
Additionally, the framing process is a conscious effort by a group. This ties the culturally 
loaded framing process to the more physical concept of a group. Further, as groups 
necessarily are located somewhere or have more or less support in certain areas, I argue that 
certain areas also will be more open to certain frames. By extension of this, I have developed 
the following theoretical interpretation: 
 
When a mobilising structure or SMO with specific traits are dominant in a geographic area, 
then certain frames will resonate better in this area. Through internal competition of frames in 
a social movement, proponents of certain frames will seek out the areas with the structures 
most receptive to their worldview. This increases the mobilisation to the structure in question. 
Additionally, the mobilising structure will actively engage in framing of contemporary events 
in accordance with its worldview, thus amplifying the existing frames and increasing 
mobilisation and recruitment to the mobilising structure. This strengthens the mobilising 
structure and increases its dominance at the expense of competing structures in the same area. 
Through this process, two different structures can dominate in two different areas, while still 
being part of the same movement.  
 
In this study, the social movement theory has provided most of the theoretical framework. 
Additionally, I have utilised the interpretation described above to explain how two different 
social movement organisations could continually strengthen themselves at the same time, 
while still being part of the same movement. The interpretation was necessary in order to 




In this chapter I will first analyse the two cases Ramadi and Fallujah. This part will focus on 
the two social movement organisations the Anbar Coordination Committee in Ramadi and the 
Military Council of Tribal Revolutionaries in Fallujah, and their position in the respective 
cities. I will look at how mobilisation structures, political opportunity and framing processes 
influence the situation in the cities, the social movement organisations, and the result it leads 
to when ISIS arrives in the first days of January.  
 
Secondly, I will conduct a cross-case analysis where I look at how the two SMOs influenced 
each other throughout 2013. In this analysis I will also include how the government of Iraq 
influenced the cities differently through repression and violence.  
 
However, before I start the analysis it is necessary to address some key concepts and what 
definition of the concepts I will utilise in my study. I will provide an introduction to the Iraqi 
Security Forces, the tribes and the Sahwa, as well as giving a brief historic overview of the 
Sunni Protest movement throughout 2013.  
	
Security	forces	
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will be used to describe a federal armed force, either army, police 
or special forces, loyal to the Government of Iraq.1 This division is important because locally 
recruited paramilitary forces are usually more accepted by the local population. This becomes 
evident when the forces loyal to GOI pull out of Ramadi and Fallujah to reduce tension in 
December 2013. This does not mean that there were no security forces left, but that the forces 
that remained were loyal to their tribe and local structures, not GOI. These forces were 
typically local police or paramilitaries. I will not treat these as a separate group, but as a part 
of the armed forces controlled by tribes in Ramadi and Fallujah. 
	
Tribes	
The tribes of Anbar are central in the Sunni Protest movement. A tribe is not necessarily 
based on lineage, but rather “[…] a form of political identity based on common claimed 
descent.” (Eisenstadt, 2007:16). This means that that identity and tribal connections are 
																																																								
1The ISF in Anbar is organised under Anbar Operations Command (AOC). AOC should 
technically coordinate all security efforts in the province. However, because of limited 
resources and manpower, the command is focusing on defensive operations and unable to 
conduct effective offensives. Additionally, different parts of the security forces are 
organisationally linked to different ministries in Baghdad and have a stronger loyalty to their 
ministries than the AOC (Jensen, 2016). This way, conflicts between ministries are often 
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dynamic and can change with opportunities related to security, economy or political influence 
(Eisenstadt, 2007:16). The tribe is important in self-identification and for an individual’s 
possibilities to succeed in life, as tribes provide for its members through patronage. This 
makes tribes an important factor in Iraq’s political process.  
 
This study will not describe the intra- and intertribal relations in detail. It will focus on the 
most influential tribes in Ramadi and Fallujah, focusing on their history with regards to 
participation in the Sahwa. Tribes are composed of several sub-units, like clans and families, 
and there are literally thousands of clans (Eisenstadt, 2007). I will not distinguish between 
levels, but refer to all as “tribe”. Thus, “tribe” is used to describe an identity-based group 
based on common claimed descent, loyal to a tribal leader, the Sheik. The tribes were central 
in defeating AQI in 2006-2007 through their participation in the Sahwa. 
	
The	Sahwa	
The Sahwa, or Anbar Awakening, is the name of the popular Sunni uprising against ISI, ISIS 
predecessor, in late 2006 (Stern and Berger, 2016). At its largest, it consisted of more than 
100,000 fighters (Gartenstein-Ross and Jensen, 2015). Several tribes in Anbar province 
formed the group Anbar Salvation Council (ASC), which formed an alliance with the United 
States in order to defeat ISI (Long, 2008). Relying on tribes to defeat ISI in Anbar was a 
success and the United States started to create similar alliances throughout Iraq (Long, 2008). 
This approach was central in marginalising ISI in Anbar. 
 
The leader of ASC was Ahmed Abu Risha, a tribal leader from Ramadi. Other Sahwa forces 
were formed as well, like the one under control of Ali Hatem al-Suleiman, a tribal leader from 
Fallujah. However, Suleiman was not cooperating as closely with the U. S. as Abu Risha. 
Because of their prominent positions, both of them would become important personalities in 
the Sunni Protest movement. 
	
The	Sunni	Protest	Movement	
Iraq’s Sunni minority had dominated the political elite in since the country’s independence in 
1932, but faced a new reality when Shia groups took power after the American invasion in 
2003 (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:283). The Shia domination continued throughout the period 
of American presence in Iraq, and a Shia party, State of Law Coalition (SLC) led by Nouri al-
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Maliki, won the parliamentary elections 2010 (Whiteside, 2014). In forming the government, 
SLC and other Shia blocs merged into the National Alliance (NA) to avoid any form of Sunni 
influence (Sowell, 2014). 
 
The Sunni population was increasingly marginalised through lack of real political 
representation, and grievances from illegal arrests and mistreatment in the legal system were 
on the rise (Sowell, 2014). This caused many Sunnis to start looking for a way to increase the 
influence over their own destiny and some wanted to establish an autonomous region through 
legal action in late 2011 (Sowell, 2014). However, the Government of Iraq (GOI) rejects this 
move and is unwilling to increase the Sunni influence.  
 
In December 2012, GOI arrests several bodyguards and staff members of Iraq’s finance 
minister Rafi al-Issawi, on charges of terrorism (Sowell, 2014). Issawi is a moderate Sunni, 
and a native of Fallujah, where peaceful protests broke out and quickly spreads to Ramadi. 
Through demonstrations, the Sunni population expressed a deep resentment towards the 
established political system that had excluded them for years. This forced notables such as 
clerics, tribal leaders and politicians to clearly choose a side, after alternating between 
supporting and defying GOI for several years (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). 
“Simply put, playing both sides became socially unacceptable.” (International Crisis Group, 
2013). 
 
Protest sites were established in all major Sunni cities, including Fallujah and Ramadi 
(International Crisis Group, 2014). Clerics, politicians, tribes, other Sunni factions and even 
jihadists had one overarching goal in common; to end GOI control over Sunni towns (Abbas, 
2014b). Demonstrations against discrimination, withdrawal of GOI security forces from 
Sunni-areas and reintegration of officers who had been fired for sectarian reasons were held in 
all larger Sunni cities (International Crisis Group, 2014).  
 
According to Sowell (International Crisis Group, 2014) the protest sites were mainly 
controlled by factions within the protest movement that can be divided into two types: First, 
mainstream groups associated with a Sunni political bloc called Mutahidun, mainly present in 
Ramadi, and second, groups who were not part of the political process, several of whom were 
fronts for insurgent groups that had operated from 2003 to 2007 (Sowell, 2014). The second 
type had a large presence in Fallujah. 
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Despite the hostility between the protesters and the Maliki government, there were some 
negotiation efforts between GOI and the mainstream parts of the protest movement in 2013, 
but after losing seats in the Governorate elections in April 2013, Nouri al-Maliki concluded 
there was little to be gained by compromising with the Sunnis (Sowell, 2014). However, an 
event in Hawija would increase the distance between GOI and the protesters. 
 
On April 23 2013, special forces under the direction of the GOI killed 44 and wounded 110 
civilian protesters in a protest camp in Hawija, Kirkuk province (UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014). 
Even though Hawija is located about 220 kilometres North of Fallujah, the events had a 
negative impact on both Ramadi and Fallujah. This was a sense of injustice perpetrated by the 
state against the protesters and proved Maliki’s malicious intent. Several groups in both cities 
called for the Sunni to take up arms against the government. Additionally, the group that was 
one of the dominant groups in Fallujah also controlled the protest site in Hawija. I will 
describe this in more detail in the chapter on Fallujah. 
 
However, the Hawija event caused parts of the protest movement to conclude that violence 
was the only way to deal with GOI (International Crisis Group, 2014). As GOI increasingly 
intimidated Sunni protest leaders through threats, arrests and terrorism charges, the 
mainstream protesters and protest leaders were driven into an insurgency and the arms of 
extremist groups (Sowell, 2014).  
 
One of the incidents that contributed to increasing the tension between GOI and the protesters 
was the arrest of Sunni MP Ahmad al-Alwani. On December 28 2013, ISF arrested Alwani of 
the Islamic Party, one of the Anbar Coordination Committee leaders (Sowell, 2014:60). 
Alwani’s brother and sister were killed, and while GOI stated that the violence occurred when 
bodyguards had resisted the arrest, Alwani’s family said the siblings were executed (Sowell, 
2014). This incident is a good illustration of the increasing tension between the Sunni Protest 
movement and the government, but it is not central to my analysis. In the last days of 
December 2013, the ISF’s move on the protest site is a deciding factor in releasing the 
violence and I will focus on this in the analysis. 
 
The tension peaked December 30, when GOI shut down the cell phone network started to 
demolish the protest sites in Ramadi and Fallujah with bulldozers (Sowell, 2014). This caused 
several tribes to take up arms against ISF in both cities and Sunni parties still active in 
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Baghdad threatened to withdraw from the political process (Sowell, 2014). Maliki ordered the 
security forces to pull back, and a mix of tribal forces, insurgents and jihadists took over 
Ramadi and Fallujah (Knights, 2014). Several gunfights erupted in both cities, and when the 
security forces tried to return to Fallujah unidentified gunmen blocked them from entering the 
city. In Ramadi the tribes soon cooperated with ISF to stop the fighting and restore law and 
order (Institute for the Study of War, 2014). 
 
The attack in Hawija, Maliki’s disdain for the protesters, ISF’s move on the protest sites and 
the siege of Fallujah are important events in explaining how the Sunni Protest movement 
evolved throughout 2013. Important events are framed differently by different groups in the 
movement, and serve as drivers of collective action through confirming existing frames and 





Ramadi is the largest city and the provincial capital of Anbar. It serves as the seat of the 
provincial political power and religious authority. It is the dominant city in a province largely 
marginalised and ignored by the government, the only city in Anbar that can claim to have 
some influence in Baghdad (West, 2005).  
 
The governor from the Islamic Party and the provincial council are based in the city. The 
Islamic Party, that would become a part of the Mutahidun bloc, held office in Anbar from 
2005 to 2009, but had little actual influence in the province. The Mutahidun bloc dominated 
the June 2013 provincial elections in Anbar and got the majority in the council, as well as the 
governor.2 The Mutahidun moved closer to GOI in order to strengthen the bloc’s position in 
front of the 2014 parliamentary elections (International Crisis Group, 2014).They hold power 
over the appointment of mayors and senior security officials in the Anbar cities, like police 
																																																								
2 The elections were planned for April, but were postphoned in because of the deteriorating 
security situation. 
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chiefs. The city is also the seat of the senior Sunni mufti3 and the head of the Sunni 
Endowment. 4  
 
Both the clerical and political actors are connected to Baghdad, because much of their power 
is derived from the economic and political support of the government. Because the religious 
and political authority is gathered in Ramadi, it is considered a pivotal city. The situation in 
Ramadi provides a good indicator of who holds the most influence in the province. The 
government or other groups. 
 
The two dominant groups in Ramadi during the protests in 2013 were the “Anbar 
Coordination Committee” headed by the MP Ahmad al-Alwani, and the “Popular 
Committees” headed by the Sahwa leader Ahmad Abu Risha (Sowell, 2014). Both Risha and 
Alwani were also political leaders in the Mutahidun bloc (Sowell, 2014:47). Because the two 
groups were so closely connected and both relatively moderate, I will treat them as one and 
refer to it as the Anbar Coordination Committee. Further, I argue that the Anbar Coordination 
Committee can be understood as a social movement organisation (SMO) within the Sunni 
Protest movement, because it is a collection of groups that work together and evolve into a 
new organisation, specifically tied to the Sunni Protest movement. 
 
For an analysis of how the different SMOs gained influence within the framework of the 
Sunni Protest movement in Ramadi, the distinction between the two committees would be 
central, but that is not the point of this study. This study analyses how moderate and radical 
SMOs affected the Sunni Protest movement as a whole. Referring to two different, moderate 
SMOs in Ramadi is not central in showing the intramovement dynamics of radical flank 
effect and competing frames. Rather, it would obscure the analysis with unnecessary details.  
 
When it comes to leadership structure in the Anbar Coordination Committee it is hard to 
verify who was the leader, or if there even was just one leader. Committees like this usually 
have several influential leadership figures with command over different parts of the 
committee. A tribal leader will command the fighters he brings to the faction, while a 
politician or cleric will bring organisational skills or religious authority (International Crisis 
Group, 2013). Either way, these roles are also often intertwined. Abu Risha, for example, is 
																																																								
3 Legal scholar in Islamic law. 
4 The Sunni Endowment is a quasi-governmental organ that oversees Sunni mosques. 
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both a tribal leader and politician, as he commands large amounts of votes with his influence 
as tribal leader. 
	
Mobilising	structures	
The “Pride and Dignity Square” in Ramadi became the largest protest site and the symbolic 
centre of the Sunni Protest movement in 2013 (Whiteside, 2014). The dominant SMO was the 
Anbar Coordination Committee that contained important tribal leaders and was backed by 
two important pillars that provided legitimacy in the Sunni Arab community in Iraq; Sunni- 
based anti-Maliki political parties and the clerical establishment (Sowell interview by 
Musings on Iraq, 2013).  
 
Political	parties	
Sunni-based anti-Maliki political parties organised under Osama al-Nujafi’s Mutahidun block 
became the main political actors in the Anbar Coordination Committee (Sowell interview by 
Musings on Iraq, 2013). Nujafi was the Speaker of Parliament, and central in bringing 
together most of the Sunni parties (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). Other 
prominent figures in the bloc were former Finance Minister Rafi Issawi and Ahmed al-Alwani 
of the Islamic Party (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). Said al-Lafi was the 
spokesman for the Anbar Coordination Committee (Wicken, 2013). He was a young religious 
scholar, and possibly a member of the Islamic Party (Wicken, 2013:28). 
 
The political organisations provided expertise in media relations and administration, and 
strengthened the Coordination Committee’s organisation (International Crisis Group, 2013). 
This made the Committee well organised and effective in communicating their message 
through the media (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). Nujafi’s political experience 
also made him central in making the 13 demands put forward by the Coordination Committee 
in January 2013. The demands called for cancellation of the capital punishment clause in the 
Counter-Terrorism Law, fair treatment from the security forces, freeing innocent detainees 
and for the Maliki government to adhere to the Constitution of Iraq (Sowell interview by 
Musings on Iraq, 2013). 
  
The Mutahidun bloc dominated the June 2013 provincial elections in Anbar and moved closer 
to GOI in order to strengthen the bloc’s position in front of the 2014 parliamentary elections 
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(International Crisis Group, 2014). Mutahidun argued in favour of negotiations with Maliki, 
improving the relationship between local police and the army, and reactivate the Sahwa forces 
to protect the Sunni from ISIS (International Crisis Group, 2014). 
 
The	clerical	establishment	
The clerical establishment supportive of the Coordination Committee was led by Sheik Abdul 
Malik al-Saadi, who became a form of spiritual guide for the protesters (Sowell interview by 
Musings on Iraq, 2013, International Crisis Group, 2013). Other dominant religious 
personalities within the Sunni community also expressed support to the Committee. Among 
them were Rafia al-Rafai, recognized as the head mufti by most Iraqi Sunni and Ahmad 
Abdul Ghafour al-Samarraie, leader of the Sunni Endowment(Sowell interview by Musings 
on Iraq, 2013). Rafai was moderate and highly influential in his position as an important legal 
scholar. Samarraie appointed and held significant power over the Sunni clerics that preached 
in the Mosques in Iraq. Additionally, the Endowment was close to Maliki and was interested 
in keeping a good relationship with him. 
 
The clerics “[…] bestowed religious legitimacy and a broader sense of communal belonging.” 
(International Crisis Group, 2013:18). Friday’s prayer attracted large audiences, where 
protesters could cement their unity and reiterate their demands, while clerics confirmed the 
righteousness of the demands and strengthened the protesters’ resolve (International Crisis 
Group, 2013).  
 
The protests also provided favourable conditions in which clerics could position themselves 
in an intra-clerical conflict (International Crisis Group, 2013:19). The conflict line was drawn 
between clerics who had been given benefits and perks from GOI in return for staying 
apolitical, and the rest of the clerics, with the former finding themselves on the defensive 
(International Crisis Group, 2013). The Sunni Endowment, a quasi-governmental organ that 
oversees Sunni mosques was criticised for not prioritising the Sunni population over their 
own interests, and playing into Maliki’s hands by strictly adhering to the separation of 
religion and politics (International Crisis Group, 2013). This rhetoric was also very popular 
among the protesters and secured the anti-Maliki clerics support. Still, they argued in favour 
of working inside the political process and remained relatively moderate (Sowell interview by 
Musings on Iraq, 2013).  
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The moderate clerics, often represented by Saadi, argued that the movement’s goal should be 
to reform within the existing system to secure rights for the Sunni population (International 
Crisis Group, 2013:23). Even though many people wanted Saadi to issue a fatwa5 to justify 
violent action against GOI, Saadi refused (International Crisis Group, 2013). 
 
Tribes	
Most of the tribes in Ramadi participated in the Sahwa and were key in defeating AQI in 
Anbar (Knights, 2014). As former Sahwa they had been allied with Maliki, and the return of 
ISIS could pose a threat to them, fearing retaliation for past actions (Knights, 2014).  
 
Sheik Ahmed Abu Risha was one of the most prominent tribal leaders engaged in the Ramadi 
protest site (Sowell, 2014). Risha succeeded his brother6 as the Sahwa leader and fought 
fiercely against AQI in 2007. Risha supported the protests from the beginning, but moved 
closer to Maliki towards the end of 2013, possibly under threat of terrorism charges (Musings 
on Iraq, 2014c, Sowell, 2014). Additionally, when Risha first sided with the protesters in 
early 2013, GOI funded a new Sahwa force and put one of Abu Risha’s rivals in charge of it 
(International Crisis Group, 2014). Risha was also possibly co-opted by Maliki with promises 
of money, power and support for development projects (Musings on Iraq, 2014a). 
 
One can argue that the reason for Risha’s support to ISF and Maliki can be explained by his 
role as a Sahwa commander, and that he feared revenge for his fight against AQI, ISIS 
predecessor. However, there were also former enemies of ISIS in Fallujah, and here the group 
chose to strike a conciliatory tone (Knights, 2014). This pragmatic approach suggests that 
ISIS was interested in cooperating with just about anyone, and it is clear that an alliance with 
Abu Risha would have been a great propaganda victory, as well as a considerable contribution 
of fighters. Additionally, ISIS initially had just a few hundred fighters in the Ramadi and 
Fallujah area, and it is unlikely that they posed a serious threat to Abu Risha.  
 
																																																								
5 ”[…] a formal ruling or interpretation on a point of Islamic law given by a qualified legal 
scholar […]” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017). 




There were also more extreme elements in the protest movement in Ramadi (International 
Crisis Group, 2013). The protest sites provided opportunity for clerics with ties to Salafi 
trends to gain followers and preach their understanding of Islam (International Crisis Group, 
2013). There were also several clerics in their early 30s who wanted to make a name for 
themselves (International Crisis Group, 2013). Due to their lack of experience, their religious 
authority was considered insufficient to act as proper religious guides (International Crisis 
Group, 2013:19). However, their flaming speeches and active participation in demonstrations 
has earned several of these preachers support, especially from the younger generation of 
protesters (International Crisis Group, 2013:19).  
 
Despite their popularity with the more radical groups and individuals, they did not have the 
authority to challenge Saadi and the more moderate clerics. They were still present and active 
in the protests, especially in the outdoor sermons7. However, the moderates dominated the 
Anbar Coordination Committee and supressed radical elements in Ramadi. 
 
Mobilising	structures	conclusion	
When looking at how a movement develops, the central point regarding mobilising structures 
is the organisational profile, not the availability of resources (McAdam et al., 1996). The 
Anbar Coordination Committee dominated the protests in Ramadi. The organisation was 
centrally controlled, mostly kept the protesters in line and with traits commonly associated 
with political parties. This, combined with the basic acceptance of the political process, 
willingness to negotiate and moderate goals, makes the movement in Ramadi a relatively 
moderate actor. Even though Ramadi was radicalised throughout 2013, the Committee’s 
moderate image was strengthened by the Sunni Protest movement’s radical flank in Fallujah. 
Additionally, over time, radical elements were supressed and rejected in Ramadi, several 
relocating to Fallujah where the general mood was more extreme and more open to radical 
rhetoric (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). 
 
																																																								
7 Sermons held outside tended to be less moderate in nature, because the Sunni Endowment 
controlled the clerics preaching inside the mosques, thus being able to influence or even fire 
clerics they deemed too radical (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). 
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Political	opportunity	
Maliki’s government represses the Sunni Protest movement throughout 2013 in different 
ways. Harassment, threats and arrest warrants against protesters and protest leaders, as well as 
actual arrests brought the Sunni Protest movement to the boiling point at the end of 2013. 
Additionally, violent events such as the Hawija crackdown and the destruction of the protest 
sites and camps strengthened the hostility between Maliki and the protesters. 
 
Maliki made some concessions in 2013 during negotiations with the Sunni Deputy Prime 
Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq. This included reforming some of the repressive laws, but this 
process was sabotaged (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). Political rivals within 
the Anbar Coordination Committee did not want Mutlaq to succeed (Sowell interview by 
Musings on Iraq, 2013). This was an opportunity that was not exploited, because of conflict 
within the movement (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). Because of this, an 
opportunity for real progress on behalf of the Sunni population was left unused. This shows 
how some of the political actors were more interested in positioning themselves within the 





This event strengthened the extreme groups in the Sunni Protest movement, even though it 
took place far away in Hawija, Kirkuk province. However, as the dominant structures in the 
Anbar Coordination Committee were moderate and the radicals were marginalised, the 
strengthening of extreme groups did not affect the Coordination Committee that much. On the 
other hand, the situation was very tense in Ramadi and needed to be handled with caution. 
 
In Ramadi, Saadi did what he could to handle the situation constructively. He was also 
temporarily able to reduce tensions by taking an initiative towards negotiations with GOI 
(International Crisis Group, 2013:38). However, the initiative failed because of disagreements 
within the movement and lack of interest on the part of GOI (International Crisis Group, 
2013:38). The event in Hawija was one of the things that contributed to a radicalisation of the 
Anbar Coordination Committee throughout 2013 (Sowell, 2014:56). 
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The protest site 
Early in the morning on December 30 2013, ISF surrounded the protesters in Ramadi. Violent 
clashes between Abu Risha’s forces in the Anbar Coordination Committee and ISF left 
several people dead, although the details are blurry as to exactly what triggered the fighting 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014). However, as a result of these clashes, ISF was ordered to pull 
back to reduce tension in the city. This opportunity was seized by insurgents who tried to take 
control of part of the city, but were quickly defeated by Abu Risha’s tribal forces (Musings on 
Iraq, 2015). About 300 of the defeated fighters were ISIS-fighters, who then fled to Fallujah 
(Abbas, 2014a). The Anbar Coordination Committee was now in control of the city, although 
with some fighting still going on in the suburbs. 
 
When ISF returned to Ramadi in early January, Risha and most of Ramadi’s tribes realigned 
with Maliki’s forces. They formed joint patrols with Risha’s forces, and fought off the 
remaining ISIS-fighters and other extremist groups (Musings on Iraq, 2014c). The reason was 
that the Anbar Coordination Committee was still mainly interested in keeping the political 
order in Iraq, although with some concessions for the Sunni. This would have been 
impossible to achieve had they chosen to fight the ISF. On the other hand, the ISF chose not 
to use heavy-handed tactics and indiscriminate violence when they returned to Ramadi. This 
would have caused violent mobilisation against the ISF. They made this choice because they 
viewed the Anbar Coordination Committee as moderate and willing to negotiate, probably as 
long as no unnecessary violence was used against Ramadi. 
 
Creating	political	opportunity	
The militant, Baathist group JRTN stormed the Ramadi protest site on March 26 2013. Of the 
two cities, JRTN was mainly present in Fallujah throughout 2013, and will be described in 
more detail in the Fallujah chapter. 
 
By moving into Ramadi, JRTN tried to create political opportunity for themselves and 
extremists in Ramadi by persuading or coercing the Anbar Coordination Committee into 
joining them in armed conflict with GOI (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). They 
were actively trying to recruit members to their militant group, and were hoping to co-opt the 
groups who were already involved in the protest movement. According to Sowell (2014:53), 
the JRTN had hoped to “[…] sway the crowd and push the political process-linked protest 
leaders out.”. Because the moderate Anbar Coordination Committee was the dominant 
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structure, the JRTN was unable to gain much support for their cause. The Committee refused 
and JRTN decamped to Fallujah (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013).  
 
Political	opportunity	conclusion	
The Anbar Coordination Committee exploited the apparent political opportunity when ISF 
left Ramadi and took control of the city. The Committee had the support it needed from the 
clerics and the tribal leaders, in order to legitimise its rule. Although the Committee and the 
protesters had become more radical throughout the year, they decided that it was in their best 
interest to side with ISF against the militants. When ISF returned, they did not use heavy-
handed tactics against the protesters in Ramadi, even though they had been clashing at the 
protest site just a few days earlier. This further ensured that the Coordination Committee 
remained a relatively moderate actor within the Sunni Protest movement. The moderate 
structures probably ensured that events like the Hawija incident, and the JRTN’s attempt at 




The Anbar Coordination Committee is dominated by moderate mobilising structures and 
argues in favour of political process in trying to achieve less governmental influence in Anbar 
areas. Some attempts were made to seem non-sectarian, but there was a clear Sunni 
dominance. This moderation was reflected in the frames used by the Committee throughout 
the conflict, in spite of a certain radicalisation over time. That being said, there were anti-Shia 
frames in the Ramadi protest site, but not as many or as radical as in other protest sites. 
Stating that Maliki ran a sectarian government was not very radical, but a rather accurate 
description most scholars probably would agree on. 
 
General	frames	
The Anbar Coordination Committee published a list of 13 demands directed at Maliki. They 
called for cancellation of the capital punishment clause in the Counter-Terrorism Law, fair 
treatment from the security forces, freeing innocent detainees and for the Maliki government 
to adhere to the Constitution of Iraq (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). These 
demands were difficult for Maliki to concede because of political reasons. With the 2014 
elections just months away it would have been very unpopular to strengthen the Sunni at the 
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expense of the Shia politicians. However, the demands were still framed as a political act and 
signalised that the Anbar Coordination Committee understood and was willing to participate 
in a political process. On the other hand, Maliki initially rejected the demands and threatened 
to use force to disperse the protesters. Shia religious authorities rebuked Maliki and “[…] 
insisted that he meet protestor demands that were “consistent with the law and the 
constitution,” […]” (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013).  
 
The Anbar Coordination Committee argued that their struggle was not a sectarian one, but 
framed the protests as the rejection of unjust power in the hands of Maliki (International 
Crisis Group, 2013). However, a lot of the rhetoric in the protest site was clearly sectarian, 
and, ”[…] even the more moderate Ramadi camps frames [the demands] in a way, which is 
very Sunni specific, and often too sweeping.” (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). 
 
Throughout 2013 it became increasingly clear that there were extremist elements in the 
protest movement, and Risha argued that the protesters should support ISF’s effort to 
eliminate radicals in the protest sites (Gartenstein-Ross and Jensen, 2015). 
 
The moderate clerics, often represented by Saadi, argued that the movement’s goal should be 
to reform within the existing system to secure rights for the Sunni population (International 
Crisis Group, 2013:23). Saadi worked hard to keep the protests peaceful and non-sectarian, 
even after the Hawija crackdown by Maliki’s forces (International Crisis Group, 2013). After 
the incident in Hawija, Saadi called for the establishment of a “Defence Army”, strictly meant 
to protect the Sunni and not calling for jihad or going on the offensive (Sowell interview by 
Musings on Iraq, 2013).  
 
Event	specific	frames	
The violence in Hawija on April 23 2013 was portrayed as a security operation by GOI, while 
the protesters in Hawija and other protest sites called it a premeditated attack (International 
Crisis Group, 2013). One protester in Hawija stated “The government sent [ISF] forces from 
Baghdad to Hawija. They are all Shiites and they committed a massacre.” (International Crisis 
Group, 2013:32). This extreme framing had some resonance in Ramadi, and several groups 
called for the Sunni to take up arms against the government. Some were even quite vocal 
when arguing in favour of armed conflict. Even though the moderate frames of the dominant 
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structures prevailed, the violence in Hawija clearly contributed to the radicalisation of Ramadi 
(Sowell, 2014). 
 
When ISF cleared the protest sites December 30 2013, Saadi called for the Sunni to take up 
arms against the GOI and mobilise to stop ISF reinforcements from reaching Ramadi, for the 
ISF to disobey their orders, and for the Sunni political parties to boycott all political processes 
(Institute for the Study of War, 2014). His main concern was to end fighting in Anbar and to 
repel both terrorists and ISF (International Crisis Group, 2014). The mobilisation of the 
protesters and groups in Ramadi caused the ISF to pull out of the city to reduce tensions.  
 
When ISF returned shortly after, there was little violence against the population in Ramadi. 
Thus, when ISIS and other militants attacked Ramadi in the first days of January, the 
Mutahidun bloc encouraged all citizens to cooperate with the ISF and fight off the extremists 
(International Crisis Group, 2014). The Mutahidun argued in favour of a centrist approach to 
bridge the divide between the protesters and the GOI (International Crisis Group, 2014). 
Additionally, they argued that the only way to defeat the rise of jihadists in Anbar was to re-
establish the Sahwa forces and cooperate with the government (International Crisis Group, 
2014).  
 
The framing of ISF as an allied force that would support Ramadi in fighting terrorists was 
confirmed when ISF and the tribal forces worked together. Additionally, there was little 
violence when the ISF returned, and no random bombardment. This combination strengthened 
the moderate stand of the Anbar Coordination Committee within the Sunni Protest movement. 
	
Framing	processes	conclusion	
The dominant mobilising structures in Ramadi were relatively moderate. Because of this, 
moderate frames resonated well in the city and the Anbar Coordination Committee further 
strengthened the moderates by actively framing contemporary events in accordance with its 
moderate views. This marginalised and rejected extreme elements, causing several to leave 
the city, further strengthening the moderate. The Committee could utilise political frames of 
progress and influence through negotiations, because of Mutahidun’s political authority. 
Additionally, what little influence and political connections they had to Baghdad could also 
be used to their advantage. 
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ISF’s approach to Ramadi when the soldiers returned, confirmed the moderate view that the 
ISF was a useful ally. Additionally, it disproved the extremists who tried to frame the ISF as a 
force that would ethnically cleanse the Sunni. This marginalised the extremists in Ramadi 
further. Moderate clerics, politicians and tribal supported each other’s messages and provided 
legitimacy to the Anbar Coordination Committees framing. This contributed to making the 
Coordination Committee the dominant structure in Ramadi. 
 
Ramadi	conclusion	
The Anbar Coordination Committee was centrally controlled, mostly kept the protesters in 
line and with traits commonly associated with political parties. This, combined with the basic 
acceptance of the political process, willingness to negotiate and moderate goals, makes the 
movement in Ramadi a relatively moderate actor. Even though Ramadi was radicalised to 
some degree throughout 2013, the dominant mobilising structures in Ramadi remained 
relatively moderate. Because of this, moderate frames resonated well in the city and the Anbar 
Coordination Committee was further strengthened by actively framing contemporary events 
in accordance with its moderate views. This marginalised and rejected extreme elements, 
causing several to leave the city, further strengthening the Committee. 
 
The violence in Hawija and the extreme framing of it had some resonance in Ramadi, and 
several groups called for the Sunni to take up arms against the government. Some were even 
quite vocal when arguing in favour of armed conflict. Even though the moderate frames of the 
dominant structures prevailed, the violence in Hawija clearly contributed to the radicalisation 
of Ramadi (Sowell, 2014). 
 
The Anbar Coordination Committee exploited the apparent political opportunity when ISF 
left Ramadi and took control of the city. When ISF returned, they did not use heavy-handed 
tactics against the protesters in Ramadi, even though they had been clashing at the protest site 
just a few days earlier. Although the Committee and the protesters had become more radical 
throughout the year, they still were not radical enough to cooperate with ISIS and instead 
decided that it was in their best interest to side with ISF. In Fallujah, however, the situation 





With an estimated number of over 500 mosques, Fallujah is often called “The City of 
Mosques”. It is the home of Sunni Muslim tribes who are largely conservative in religious 
matters and tribal customs, wielding considerable fighting power through tribal militias 
(Habib, 2014, West, 2005, Fishman, 2016). A city where “[…] all the people in the city have 
at least one weapon in their home.” according to one tribal leader (Habib, 2014). Fallujah had 
a tough reputation and after the Baath party took control in 1968, the city became a “[…] 
source of enforcers for the ruling Sunni-dominated Baath Party.” (West, 2005:13). 
 
From 2003, Fallujah was the base of operations for Tawhid wal-Jihad (TWJ), AQI’s 
predecessor, under the leadership of Zarqawi (Tønnessen, 2015). TWJ was one of several 
groups operating in and out of Fallujah, and conducted attacks against Shia targets and U. S. 
forces (Ware and Guttentag, 2015, Warrick, 2015). After four U. S. contractors were killed 
and mutilated in Fallujah in 2004, the city became the scene of some of the hardest fighting 
U. S. forces had ever taken part in as The Marine Corps conducted an offensive to take 
control of the city later the same year (West, 2005). 
 
The Sahwa did not gain strong support in Fallujah, and many of the tribes chose to join the 
local police forces instead (International Crisis Group, 2014). The local police are usually 
more loyal to local structures than the provincial or governmental level. Additionally, the 
population in Fallujah did not reject AQI to the same extent as the population in Ramadi in 
2006 and 2007 (Knights, 2014). Still, the tribes of Fallujah did contribute to driving AQI out 
in 2007 because of the group’s brutality and extremist interpretation of Islamic law. 
 
The Mutahidun bloc dominated the June 2013 provincial elections in Anbar and gained 
influence in councils and governing bodies in all the cities, including Fallujah (International 
Crisis Group, 2014). They grew closer to GOI throughout 2013 in order to strengthen the 
bloc’s position in front of the 2014 parliamentary elections. This was highly unpopular in 




The dominant factions will first be described individually under mobilising structures. Later 
they will be treated as a unity, the Military Council of Tribal Revolutionaries8, even though 
they did not formally unite until ISF left Fallujah. However, treating them as one will make it 
clearer how social movement theory can explain the radicalisation in Fallujah. I argue that the 
Military Council can be understood as a social movement organisation (SMO) within the 
Sunni Protest movement, because it is a collection of groups that work together and evolve 
into a new organisation, specifically tied to the Sunni Protest movement. 
 
Mobilising	structures	
The skills, access and strategy of the mobilising structure, the organisational profile, is a very 
important factor in how a movement develops. Access to particular networks or resources, the 
skills to utilise them and a strategy that decides the direction is central when a movement is 
developing (McAdam et al., 1996). 
 
The	Military	Council	of	Tribal	Revolutionaries	
The Military Council of Tribal Revolutionaries was a council that was assembled in the first 
days of January 2014 and took control in Fallujah when ISF left the city. It consisted of 
former insurgent groups and tribes from the Fallujah area. The Naqshbandi Army and the 
Dulaimi tribe were most influential actors in the Military Council. The Naqshbandi and the 
tribes allowed ISIS to join the council when they arrived a few days later. 
Groups thought to subscribe to incompatible ideologies, Sufi, Salafi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, coexisted and were able to cooperate within the framework of the Military 
Council (International Crisis Group, 2014). Motivated by the goal of keeping the ISF and 
GOI out of the city, the council directed military and security operations, aided civilians and 
recruited new followers (International Crisis Group, 2014). 
 
Both the Dulaimi tribal leader Ali Hatem al-Suleiman and Abdullah al-Janabi have been 
mentioned as the leader of the Military Council. Janabi, a Salafi cleric, was exiled in Syria 
after leading Fallujah’s Mujahedin Shura Council during 2004 and the fight against U. S. 
forces (Sowell, 2015). Suleiman supposedly led the Military Council of Tribal 
Revolutionaries because of his central position in the Dulaimi tribe (Gartenstein-Ross and 
																																																								
8 Not to be confused with the ”General Military Council of Iraq”, an insurgent group 
consisting of 1920s Revolutions Brigade and JRTN that would become active in Mid-January 
(Sowell, 2014:62). 
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Jensen, 2015). There is probably truth in both views, as the new coalition depended on 
support from both tribes and clerics. 
 
There were no mainstream political actors in the Military Council, because these had been 
marginalised in Fallujah throughout 2013. However, the Mutahidun bloc was present from the 
beginning of 2013, although with decreasing influence towards the end of the year. 
 
Political	parties	
Political parties are important mobilising structures, because they have experience in 
traditional political work like media handling, public speaking, arranging rallies and lobbying. 
If there is access to the political world through a political party and traditional political skills, 
then this will be utilised. If the SMO knows how to lobby, then it will try to do that.  
 
The moderate Mutahidun bloc dominated the 2013 provincial elections in Anbar, and gained 
the majority in the provincial council (International Crisis Group, 2014). This gave the 
Mutahidun great political power and influence over the appointment of police chiefs and 
mayors in Anbar (International Crisis Group, 2014). Even though the Mutahidun had little 
local support in Fallujah, they appointed Mutahidun-affiliated officials to these important 
positions. The Mutahidun-affiliated officials recruited fighters from outside the city to serve 
in the police force, and excluded the city’s former leadership from decision-making processes 
on local and provincial levels (International Crisis Group, 2014). By doing this, the 
Mutahidun had neither a local political base, nor a local armed base. By excluding the former 
leadership, the Mutahidun became very unpopular among the city’s urban elite. 
 
Because of the lack of a local base and support, and essentially a foreign element, there was 
no mobilisation around the Mutahidun political bloc in Fallujah during the protests. The bloc 
was marginalised, and had no influence in how radical or moderate the Military Council 
would become or which means it would utilise. 
 
Tribes	
The tribes are important in mobilising for several reasons. First, tribal loyalty enables the 
Sheik to mobilise people at his command. This means that convincing a Sheik to mobilise his 
tribe can have a huge effect on mobilisation. Secondly, some of Iraq’s tribes consist of 
millions or hundreds of thousands of people, giving the Sheik a wide reach. However, this 
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does not necessarily mean that the Sheik can command everyone in his tribe to join in a 
demonstration, but his position enables him to spread his message through tribal networks and 
councils. Additionally, the tribes, like many others in Iraq, have access to weapons. This way, 
the Sheik also commands a fighting force, his own private army, which is also his power base 
and source of legitimacy. 
 
Ali Hatem al-Suleiman is the head of the most prominent tribe in Fallujah, the Dulaimi, one 
of Iraq’s largest (Spencer and Malouf, 2014, Hassan, 2007, Habib, 2014). He contributed with 
resources like food and tents for protesters, as well as mobilising large parts of his tribe in the 
protests. Suleiman supported the Sunni Protest movement from the beginning and started off 
giving mainstream speeches in line with the demands put forth by the Coordination 
Committee in Ramadi (Musings on Iraq, 2014d). However, his rhetoric grew increasingly 
inflammatory and anti-Shia, and soon he accused Maliki of being a puppet of Iran (Musings 
on Iraq, 2014d). Suleiman supported the division of Iraq into three separate states 
(Gartenstein-Ross and Jensen, 2015). He also argued in favour of arming the protest sites and 
taking on the government (Musings on Iraq, 2014d). Because of his increasingly hostile 
attitude towards the GOI, a warrant was issued for Suleiman’s arrest (Musings on Iraq, 
2014d). The threat of arrest on terrorism charges caused Suleiman to head for Erbil, where he 
continued to work against Maliki, unlike his rival Abu Risha who would grow closer to GOI 
throughout 2013 (Musings on Iraq, 2014d).  
 
Suleiman was one of several tribal leaders who resented Abu Risha’s ascent to power during 
the Sahwa (Gartenstein-Ross and Jensen, 2015). They were both Sheiks that gained power 
after the U. S. invasion, heading the two main Sahwa factions, where Risha’s was the one 
closest associated with the U. S. forces (Musings on Iraq interview with Ali Hatem al-
Suleiman, 2008). Their rivalry was apparent, and became even more explicit throughout 2013. 
While Abu Risha called for the protesters to support ISF in removing the most radical 
elements and give the political process a chance, Suleiman would encourage the protesters to 
continue and to defend themselves against ISF (Gartenstein-Ross and Jensen, 2015). 
 
According to Warrick (2015), the Dulaimi tribe and ISIS created an alliance in the first days 
of January, that subsequently drew support from other Sunni tribes. This seems likely, as 
Suleiman in June 2014 stated officially that he and his tribe was allied with ISIS, and that 
they would not break that alliance until Maliki stepped down as prime minister (Spencer and 
	 54	
Malouf, 2014). Alternatively, he said, he would have to “[…] march a hundred thousand men 
on Baghdad […].” (Spencer and Malouf, 2014). 
 
The mobilising of Suleiman’s tribal networks contributed heavily to the protests and the 
Military Council in Fallujah, as he commanded a large armed force. Additionally, the ability 
to mobilise and allocate resources effectively made it possible to maintain mobilisation 
throughout 2013, and even in the conflict with GOI. Further, when Suleiman decides to be a 
part of the Military Council and creates an alliance with ISIS, his influence also causes other 
tribes to join, increasing the mobilisation. 
 
Former	insurgent	groups	
The former insurgent groups in Fallujah had been active in fighting against the U. S., but had 
been marginalised after being defeated by or recruited to the Sahwa or other armed groups. 
The mobilisation of these groups provided access to networks that formerly had been used to 
fuel an insurgency. Additionally, the skills these groups provided were also mostly related to 
some kind of armed struggle against a foreign invader, and when combining the resources and 
skills, the result was a capable fighting force. 
 
Nationalist	groups	
The Naqshbandi Army 
The Army of the men of the Naqshbandi way (Jaish Rijjal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandiya, JRTN) 
is a group consisting of former Baathist insurgents, remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime 
(UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014). Fallujah was the only city in Anbar where JRTN was permanently 
present (Sowell, 2014) It was probably the strongest of the former insurgent groups in 
Fallujah and wielded a considerable amount of fighters. The group was led by Izzat Ibrahim 
al-Douri who was Saddam Hussein’s right-hand man during Saddam’s reign (al-Tamimi, 
2014b). 
 
Members of the Naqshbandi Army deny any connection to the former regime, but there is a 
consensus that many of the former Baathists have found JRTN to be the group closest to their 
ideology (International Crisis Group, 2013). Many of the former high-level Baathists are 
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unemployed as a result of the de-Baathification law9, and felt that they had been robbed of 
work, influence and status for themselves and their family by the governing Shia 
(International Crisis Group, 2013). The sense of injustice was further strengthened by seeing 
former Baathist, who happened to be Shia, regaining positions in the army by pledging 
allegiance to GOI (International Crisis Group, 2013). 
 
Even though the Baathist political ideology is predominantly secular, the JRTN subscribes to 
the conservative Sunni Islamic Sufi order called Naqshbandi, and not the prevailing Salafi 
currents in Sunni dominated areas of Iraq (International Crisis Group, 2013, 
UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014). This contributed to their ability to mobilise among the urban elite in 
Fallujah, as they came off as more secular and modern than other insurgent groups. However, 
they often used jihadist rhetoric to strengthen the religious legitimacy. Even though they were 
ideologically far from ISIS extreme Salafi interpretation of Islam, several sources state that 
they cooperated from early January 2014 (UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014, International Crisis 
Group, 2013).  
 
1920s Revolution Brigade 
The 1920s Revolution Brigade10 is a Sunni Islamic, nationalist militia that consists mostly of 
former Iraqi Army soldiers, and was active in the insurgency during the U. S. occupation (al-
Tamimi, 2014a, International Crisis Group, 2014). Several authors point out that the group 
has clear tendencies towards the Muslim Brotherhood (International Crisis Group, 2014, 
UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014). Even though the group has a nationalist outlook, its propaganda 
contains Islamist “language” (al-Tamimi, 2014a, UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014). Their goal is an 
“[…] independent Iraqi State on an Islamic basis.” (UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014:3). They want to 
rewrite the constitution and remove sectarian and ethnic quotas by establishing a new political 
system (International Crisis Group, 2014). Their goal of a new political system is quite 
similar to the demands of the JRTN (International Crisis Group, 2014). 
 
																																																								
9 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the first U. S. -established governing body after the 
invasion in 2003, published its Order Number 1, dismissing individuals with the position of 
director general and above, regardless of party affiliation. Additionally, everyone in the top 
four ranks of the Baath party. This was essentially barring the Sunni population from public 
life and politics (International Crisis Group, 2013). 
10 The name refers to the Iraqi nationalists that revolted against the British rule in the 1920s 
(al-Tamimi, 2014a). 
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The nationalist insurgent groups consisted of, and were able to mobilise large parts of the 
city’s urban elite. The access to administrative and governing skills, combined with a large 
fighting force, made the nationalists the strongest and most influential group in the Military 
Council, together with the tribes. 
 
Salafi	jihadist	groups	
The Salafi trend had always been strong in Fallujah (International Crisis Group, 2014). There 
were several Salafi jihadist groups active in Fallujah during the U. S. occupation, but the 
Sahwa and tribal forces marginalised them in 2006 and 2007. However, the Salafi became 
more popular during 2013 and the protests provided a good opportunity to preach and recruit.  
 
The Islamic Army in Iraq 
The Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI) is a conservative Salafi jihadist group established in 2003 as a 
response to the U. S. invasion (International Crisis Group, 2013). During the insurgency, it 
grew into an alliance of several groups “[…] with a highly Salafi narrative with patriotic 
undertones.” (International Crisis Group, 2013:23). The protests in 2013 were an opportunity 
to continue the fight against a foreign invader, formerly the U. S., replaced by the Iranian 
backed Maliki-regime (International Crisis Group, 2013).  
 
IAI’s goal was to establish a Sunni region and conduct jihad to protect the Sunni from Maliki 
and Iran (al-Tamimi interview with leader of Jaysh al-Mujahideen, 2014). However, it did not 
necessarily argue in favour of changing the entire political system, like ISIS, JRTN and Jaysh 
al-Mujahideen (al-Tamimi interview with leader of Jaysh al-Mujahideen, 2014). In fact, IAI 
set up political wing after the U. S. withdrawal from Iraq, called the Popular Sunni 
Movement, or Sunni Hirak, that was supposed to work within the political process. This move 
was criticised by other groups, and the initiative failed as a political project (al-Tamimi 
interview with leader of Jaysh al-Mujahideen, 2014). However, the Popular Sunni Movement 
became increasingly active in the protests in Ramadi after the Hawija event. As their goal was 
the establishment of an autonomous Sunni region, they found a common cause with the more 
moderate groups in Ramadi (Sowell, 2014). 
 
Although the Salafi groups were weaker than JRTN, they were able to mobilise the supporters 
of the Salafi trend that was gaining popularity in Anbar. Fallujah had a history of Salafi 
groups and the legitimacy of Salafi clerics was important in mobilising Salafi supporters. 
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Their patriotic and nationalist focus enables them to find common ground with the 
Naqshbandi, even though there traditionally is a large ideological distance between the Sufi 
and the Salafi trends. 
 
ISIS 
About 300 ISIS-fighters arrived in Fallujah on 3 January 2014, after being rejected or 
defeated by the forces of the Anbar Coordination Committee in Ramadi (Abbas, 2014a). They 
were met by local ISIS members, sleeper cells and sympathisers from areas closer to Baghdad 
(Abbas, 2014a, Abbas, 2014c). However, they were still just a few hundred fighters, inferior 
in numbers compared to the Military Council and were surrounded by tribal forces when they 
arrived (Abbas, 2014a, Habib, 2014).  
 
The presence of ISIS sparked mobilisation among the youth, because ISIS included them and 
gave them weapons and influence in the organisation. They recruited among the disillusioned 
and angry young men who had known nothing but war their entire life. Also, their reputation 




The dominant structure the Protest Movement mobilised along in Fallujah, the Military 
Council, is religiously conservative and quite radical. JRTN is militarily strong and capable 
because of experienced army officers, and together with the 1920s Revolution Brigades, 
Jaysh al-Mujahideen, ISIS and the tribal forces under Suleiman, they wanted to see Maliki’s 
government fall and establish a new political order (Sowell, 2014). The groups had this in 
common, but they differed on the question of what the end state should be: a Caliphate, an 
Iraq with a new political system or splitting Iraq into three new states. The only exception is 
IAI who would fight for the Sunni and establish a Sunni region within the frame of a united 
Iraq. Towards the end of 2013, none of the groups argued in favour of working within the 
political process. They were not co-opted or threatened into cooperation with Maliki. 
 
When looking at how a movement develops, the central point regarding mobilising structures 
is the organisational profile, that is – the access, skills and strategy of the movement (access 
to particular networks or resources, the skills to utilise them and a strategy that decides the 
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direction) (McAdam et al., 1996). In Fallujah, the organisational profile of the Military 
Council can partly explain why the movement became so violent. 
 
From the outset, there were relatively radical elements present in Fallujah. The Military 
Council consisted of former insurgent groups who rejected any form of political process. This 
structure directed the contention that is already simmering in the Sunni Protest movement 
against the GOI and ISF to achieve their radical goals. They provided an opening for more 
radical individuals to join, and socialised and indoctrinated them further. The structures were 
fine-tuned to conduct insurgent operations, and the same networks were being used to 
facilitate collective action and allocate resources. This was enhanced further by how they 
interpreted events through framing processes, which will be dealt with later. First, which 
political opportunities were present in Fallujah? 
	
Political	opportunity	
Maliki’s government repressed the Sunni Protest movement throughout 2013 in different 
ways. Harassment, threats and arrest warrants against protesters and protest leaders, as well as 
actual arrests brought the Sunni Protest movement to the boiling point at the end of 2013. 
Additionally, violent events such as the Hawija crackdown and the destruction of the protest 
sites and camps strengthened the hostility between Maliki and the protesters. 
 
Because changes the political opportunity and how they are exploited, can contribute to 
explain the shift in movement success, I will first look at how the presence or absence of state 
repression mobilised the protesters and population of Fallujah and how it was exploited as 
opportunities by the Military Council in Fallujah. Secondly, I will look at how the Military 
Council and its groups created opportunity to operate in. 
	
State	repression	
The protest site 
ISF moved on the protest site in Fallujah on 28 December 2013. Internet and cell phone 
networks had been shut down and heavily armed personnel started bulldozing the camp. The 
situation caused the tribes and the groups that would become the Military Council to mobilise, 
and together with the protesters, they fought the ISF. It is unclear whether they actually drove 
back the ISF or if ISF was ordered to pull back to reduce the tension. However, the ISF move 
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against the protest site and their repressive tactics mobilised large parts of the local 
population, creating opportunity for anyone who was able to direct this mobilisation towards 
their goals. The Military Council exploited this opportunity to increase their support in the 
local population and causing the ISF to pull out of Fallujah. They were able to this because 
they had the organisational structures, logistics and communication to effectively counter the 
ISF. 
 
ISF leaves Fallujah 
The massive mobilisation caused by ISF’s move on the protest site in Fallujah, caused ISF to 
pull completely out of the city on 30 December. They left behind a volatile situation with a 
security vacuum. This was an apparent opportunity that the Military Council took advantage 
of by filling the vacuum and inserted itself as the governing body: a coalition of tribal leaders, 
clerics and insurgents (UNAMI/OHCHR, 2014). They took control of administrative and 
security related matters, and further exploited the opportunity to include new forces in the 
defence of the city. 
 
ISF returns to Fallujah 
When the ISF tried to return to Fallujah, they were met by roadblocks and skirmishes one the 
edge of the city (Knights, 2014:9). They settled down on the outskirts of Fallujah, effectively 
besieging it (Knights, 2014:9). On January 4, ISF started firing artillery shells into the city, 
killing somewhere between eight and thirty civilians (Musings on Iraq, 2014b, BBC, 2014a). 
This mobilised the population and groups inside Fallujah to the defence of the city. 
Additionally, to further strengthen the defence of the city, the Military Council decided to ally 
itself with ISIS (International Crisis Group, 2014). 
 
In sum, it is clear that the Military Council exploited the opportunities as they rose. They 
framed incidents of state repression in order to gain followers. However, the most important 




Another aspect of political opportunity is the movement’s ability to create opportunity 
through collective action (McAdam, 1996). It can happen in two ways: first, it can happen 
directly through action that opens up space for the movement to mobilise and take action. 
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Secondly, through actions that triggers a response from a third-party. The response has 
unintended consequences and triggers mobilisation. First, I will look at how the groups in the 
Military Council created opportunity directly. 
 
ISIS had assassinated about thirteen hundred Sahwa fighters and leaders between 2009 and 
2014 (Weiss and Hassan, 2015:193). Bombings and drive-by shootings had reduced the 
number of Sahwa fighters directly, and many more had quit or deserted in fear of the on-
going assassination campaign. Additionally, Maliki had neglected the Sahwa forces and even 
prosecuted Sahwa leaders to avoid having them challenge his power. These leaders were the 
ones who could pose the most serious challenge to ISIS, and the combination of Maliki’s and 
ISIS actions increased hostility between former Sahwa fighters and GOI (Weiss and Hassan, 
2015:193). This contributed to political opportunity by creating a security vacuum that the 
Military Council could fill. Additionally, because many of the former Sahwa leaders were 
dead, turned anti-GOI or had lost their fighters and power base, none of them were able to 
challenge the Military Council for power in Fallujah. This made the Military Council the 
dominant force in the city and enabled the Council to take control of the city when ISF left. 
 
When the ISF left Fallujah, the Military Council took advantage of that opportunity to insert 
itself as the governing body in the city. To strengthen their position and increase their 
opportunity to govern, the Military Council expelled the Mutahidun officials that were left, 
and their associates, labelling them as agents of GOI and saboteurs “[…] helping the 
government “impose control over Anbar” in coordination with [Sahwa] traitors.” 
(International Crisis Group, 2014:13). This way, the Military Council created and widened 
political opportunities for itself, by completely removing the moderate influence in Fallujah. 
 
Hawija 
The second way a movement can collective action to increase political opportunity, is to do 
something that triggers a response with unintended consequences. This is exactly what 
happened in Hawija. 
 
The JRTN had tried to take advantage of the protest since the beginning and had conducted 
several attacks throughout 2013. They targeted ISF and GOI targets, and tried to provoke a 
violent reaction from the ISF that could mobilise the wider Sunni population in Iraq and 
create outside sympathy for the cause, while discrediting ISF and Maliki. They also tried to 
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create provoking situations in protest sites, to make the ISF react heavy-handed against the 
protesters. They had tried in Ramadi and other cities, but failed. However, they succeeded in 
Hawija. 
 
On 19 April 2013, an ISF checkpoint outside the Hawija protest site was attacked by gunmen 
and the ISF suffered several losses (Musings on Iraq, 2016). On April 23 ISF raided the 
protest site fighting and erupted. According to UNAMI (2014), 44 people were killed and 110 
were wounded when ISF opened fire on the protesters. According to Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq, 
one of the Naqshbandi Army’s front groups that was the dominant group in the Hawija protest 
site, 114 people were arrested in addition to the casualties (Musings on Iraq, 2016). 
 
The plan had worked perfectly and Maliki had played right into JRTN’s hands. In Fallujah, 
this incident strengthened the Military Council and mobilised more people to the Council and 
against Maliki. The incident gave a “[…] green light to former resistance groups to stage a 
series of armed retaliations.” (International Crisis Group, 2013:32). 
 
Political	opportunity	conclusion	
The presence of state repression when ISF moved on the protest site mobilised the population 
in Fallujah. The Military Council exploited this mobilisation to rally support around their 
cause, and directed the discontent against the government and the ISF. This caused violent 
confrontations and ISF retreated from the city, leaving behind a vacuum. This apparent 
opportunity was then seized by the Military Council, who took control of Fallujah and 
inserted itself as the governing body. 
 
It was possible for such an extreme faction to take control in Fallujah for two reasons. First, 
moderate political actors and possible military challengers had been marginalised through 
active targeting before and after the Military Council took control. Secondly, the population 
of Fallujah had been radicalised throughout 2013 by repression and violence, and in 
combination the ISF’s actions in Fallujah and Hawija, this legitimised the violence advocated 
by the Military Council. This radicalisation was amplified by framing processes, which is the 




As I have already described, the mobilising structures in Fallujah were religiously 
conservative, with strong tribal loyalty and anti-GOI sentiments. This influenced how they 
interpreted and framed current events, and their own role in these events. The radical actors 
will be treated as a unity, even though they did not formally unite until ISF left Fallujah.  
 
General	frames	
The general frames in Fallujah are dominated by the worldview of the dominant structures in 
the Military Council: the Baathist Naqshbandi and Salafi jihadists, both former insurgent 
groups who have been revived by the protests. The general frames in Fallujah are 
predominantly anti-Shia, jihadist and nationalist. 
 
True Islam, the Sunni and Fallujah were all under attack by the “Safavid alliance”, GOI and 
Iran. The alliance wants to destroy Fallujah and ethnically cleanse the Sunni, and the only 
way to survive is to fight and establish a new political system. As one Salafi jihadist said: 
“The Safavids are allies of the Jews and Crusaders in the war on Islam.” (2014).  
 
When the Naqshbandi joined the protest, the group stated: “[…] the people of Iraq and all its 
nationalists and Islamic forces support you until the realisation of just demands and the fall of 
the Safavid [Persian] alliance.” (International Crisis Group, 2013). The “just demands” 
referred in this statement is probably the demands put forth by the Coordination Committee in 
Anbar and is a moderate statement. The second part, however, is clearly an anti-Shia 
statement. JRTN uses clearly anti-Shia rhetoric, referring to the “Safavid alliance”, pointing 
out GOI’s close connection to the Iranian Shia regime.11 As one member said in an interview 
with International Crisis Group (2013): “We seek to liberate the country from the U.S. and 
Iran, and defend its unity and sovereignty”. 
 
The nationalist, jihadist and anti-Shia frames that are dominating in Fallujah mobilises large 
parts of the population. The nationalist frames are popular among the former Baathists with a 
secular ideology and the Salafi who want to establish a Sunni region. The anti-Shia frames 
resonate well with Baathists who feel marginalised after the de-Baathification and also among 
the radical Salafi who are opposed to the Shia by principle.  
																																																								
11 “Safavid” is a historic denotation for Persians. Used in a derogatory way by protesters.  
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During the protests, the Mutahidun in Fallujah would champion negotiations with the 
government, while at the same time degrading the population of Fallujah by belittling popular 
demands. This weakened the little support they had, and increased the distance to the groups 
that would form the Military Council. The Mutahidun’s framing of the protests created an 
outright hostile environment between the Mutahidun, the local population and the other 
groups. This segmentation increased support to the Military Council and marginalised the 
moderates even further. 
 
Event	specific	frames	
As previously described, the violence in Hawija was portrayed very differently by GOI and 
the protesters. “The government sent [ISF] forces from Baghdad to Hawija. They are all 
Shiites and they committed a massacre.” one protester in Hawija said (International Crisis 
Group, 2013:32). This resonated very well with the extreme frames of the groups in Fallujah 
and further strengthened them, and gave a “[…] green light to former resistance groups to 
stage a series of armed retaliations.” (International Crisis Group, 2013:32).  
 
After the incident in Hawija, a JRTN front group called the Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq voiced the 
need to end peaceful protests and prepare for armed jihad (al-Tamimi, 2014b). The incident 
resonated very well in Fallujah and amplified the anti-Shia frame that was already very 
strong. This increased mobilisation and radicalised the population in Fallujah. Additionally, 
the security forces that were used to raid the protest site answered directly to Maliki, it was 
very easy to blame him for the misdeeds of the ISF. 
 
ISF violence in Fallujah 
ISF’s indiscriminate shelling of Fallujah added to the perception of Sunni persecution and 
confirms the existing frames of the radical groups. The aerial bombardment and artillery fire 
supposedly targeted terrorists, but most of the firing seemed random. This radicalised the 
population in Fallujah, and strengthened the Military Council. Additionally, by using heavy-
handed tactics, ISF left the population in Fallujah no choice but to defend themselves and 
support the militant groups (Musings on Iraq, 2014b). This meant that even if people were 
negative to the Military Council to begin with, they were forced into a position where fighting 
alongside the Military Council was the best chance of keeping ISF out of the city. This also 
meant that they would be cooperating with ISIS. 
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ISIS arrives in Fallujah 
On the morning of 3 January, about 300 ISIS members arrive in Fallujah, after being defeated 
by Sahwa forces in Ramadi (Abbas, 2014a). ISIS already had some presence in Fallujah and 
surrounding areas (Musings on Iraq interview with Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, 2014). The 
newcomers were surrounded by tribal fighters upon arrival, the tribal fighters being superior 
in numbers (Abbas, 2014a). A deal was made with ISIS and the group was allowed to would 
also join the Military Council, but their influence was limited to military affairs (International 
Crisis Group, 2014:15). ISIS also agreed “[…] not to hold rallies or try to govern the city 
[…]” (Abbas, 2014a).  
 
ISIS aspirations of world domination and the establishment of a Caliphate were downplayed, 
but that did not mean that the goal had been abandoned (al-Tamimi, 2014b). Upon arrival in 
Fallujah, one ISIS fighter announced that they had come to protect the people of Fallujah and 
“[…] uphold the banner of Islam.” (Abbas, 2014a). One eyewitness also claims that the ISIS 
fighter said: “We will implement your orders. You are the people of the city and you are the 
tribes of this city.” (Habib, 2014). This fits very well with the dominating frames in Fallujah, 
because ISIS frames their presence as a being part of the force that will defend the Sunni and 
Fallujah, while respecting the tribes. 
 
Framing	processes	conclusion	
The dominant groups in Fallujah are Salafi jihadist and Baathists utilising Islamist rhetoric. 
They can credibly draw on repertoires and frames associated with uncompromising armed 
struggle against the “Safavid alliance”. The Salafi were anti-Shia for religious reasons, while 
the Baathists were anti-Shia for political reasons. Together, they could draw on large parts of 
the population in the their common anti-Shia cause. Sowell points out that “[…] calls for a 
declaration of jihad are an everyday occurrence in Fallujah.” (2013). 
 
The repression throughout 2013, the events in Hawija and ISF’s actions in Fallujah all 
contribute to confirming the frames that were already present in Fallujah; that the GOI and 
Iran wants to destroy Fallujah and ethnically cleanse the Sunni, and the only way to survive is 
through armed jihad. This further attracts radical elements with the same worldview, several 
of these coming from the Ramadi protest site. The radical groups’ active framing of issues 
radicalises Fallujah and by the end of 2013, the city and the Military Council willingly lets 
ISIS into the city. 
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Fallujah	conclusion	
The social movement organisation in Fallujah, the Military Council of Tribal Revolutionaries, 
consisted of religiously conservative and radical groups. They were former insurgent groups, 
the Baathist JRTN being the strongest, but also with Salafi jihadists and eventually ISIS. The 
goal was to destroy the political order of Iraq. The Military Council had access to the 
resources, knowledge and experience in conducting violent operations, and used this actively 
in the direction collective action. 
 
The dominant groups in Fallujah utilised Islamist rhetoric. They could credibly draw on 
repertoires and frames associated with uncompromising armed struggle against the “Safavid 
alliance”. The repression throughout 2013, the attack on the protest site in Hawija and ISF’s 
indiscriminate violence in Fallujah all contributed to confirming and amplifying the frames 
that were already present in Fallujah; that the GOI and Iran wants to destroy Fallujah and 
ethnically cleanse the Sunni, and the only way to survive was through armed jihad. This 
radicalised the protesters and population of Fallujah, and further attracted radical elements 
with the same worldview.  
 
The radicalisation of Fallujah through the amplification of extremist frames made it possible 
for the Military Council to take control of the city when the opportunity rose. Through the 
mobilisation of protesters, the Military Council caused the ISF to leave Fallujah, thus creating 
political opportunity. With no one to challenge its authority and largely being accepted as 
legitimate by the radicalised population, the Military Council willingly let ISIS into the city 
and included them in the Council. 
 
The most important part is not the opportunity itself. Opportunity requires that someone 
realises the potential, frames it as an opportunity to mobilise others, and has the will and 
capacity to exploit it. The Military Council did this in Fallujah. 
 
This study has shown that ISIS did not take control of Fallujah in the early days of January 
2014 like Fishman (2016) and Cockburn (2016, 2015) claim. Rather, through a process of 
increasing radicalisation, brought on by repression, opportunity and the effective framing of 
events, the population accepted a radical SMO, the Military Council of Tribal 
Revolutionaries, as the legitimate governing body. The Military Council accepted ISIS into 
the city and let them join the fight to protect Fallujah. What happens in the next couple of 
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The aim of this chapter is to analyse the conclusions from Ramadi and Fallujah and to show 
how the cities developed differently and how they affected each other. I will also include how 
the GOI actions and rhetoric strengthened the split between the cities and contributed to the 
outcome in the beginning of January. 
	
Mobilising	structures	and	framing	
Internal competition of frames and radical flank effect 
Social movement organisations within a movement 
“[…] engage in an intramovement contest over tactics and goals. This intramovement 
process leads to changes in the dominant frames of a movement and a succession in 
[SMO] power and influence.” (Zald, 1996:270). 
 
The internal competition of frames between the moderate and the more extreme factions 
within the Sunni Protest movement leads to the development of two different social 
movement organisations in Ramadi and Fallujah respectively. In Ramadi, the moderates are 
more successful in framing the current events in accordance with their worldview, and the 
Anbar Coordination Committee came to dominate the city. In Fallujah, the dynamic is 
markedly different. Here, the extremists prevail, effectively marginalising the moderate 
forces.  
 
The Anbar Coordination Committee in Ramadi and the Military Council of Tribal 
Revolutionaries in Fallujah had very different views of what the goal of the Sunni Protest 
movement should be and how they should achieve these goals. The Coordination Committee 
championed a Sunni region within the frames of the existing Iraqi state, while the Military 
Council wanted to destroy the government and establish a new political order. Both social 
movement organisations had in common that they framed their intra-Sunni conflicts as a 
Sunni-Shia conflict, thus taking advantage of the existing contention by directing it towards 
their own goals. 
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This competition strengthened both SMOs at the same time, but in different ways. Ramadi’s 
moderate stance in strengthened, while Fallujah’s radical stance in strengthened. This 
happened because elements sought out the area with the worldview most in accordance with 
their own. Thus, radicals went to Fallujah after failing to get a foothold in Ramadi. On the 
other hand, more moderate elements from Fallujah, like the Popular Sunni Movement, 
established a presence in Ramadi after being marginalised in Fallujah. 
 
Additionally, the structures recruit and indoctrinate further, thus strengthening themselves and 
the traits they already had, be it moderate or extremist. In the words of Sowell (2013): “[…] 
the Fallujah protest camp has gradually come to resemble nothing so much as an island of 
fanatical Ramadi rejects, al-Qaeda, the Baathist [Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq], and the Sunni 
Popular Movement in Iraq […].” (Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013).	Through this 
separation into one moderate and one radical SMO, the radical flank effect comes into action. 
 
Radical	flank	effect	
While the internal competition of frames causes the two SMOs to develop differently, the 
radical flank effect increases the difference. I will first look at how the radical flank effect 
influenced the Sunni Protest movement as a whole, before I look at how it affected Ramadi 
and Fallujah specifically. An important aspect of the radical flank effect is that it also 
influences how third parties treat the different SMOs in the movement. Thus, I will also look 
at how the government of Iraq chose to handle the movement generally, and the two SMOs 
specifically.  
 
The Sunni protest movement 
The presence of a radical flank in Fallujah, the Military Council, affected the Sunni Protest 
movement both negatively and positively. Negatively, the violent actions and jihadist rhetoric 
of the Military council undermined the Sunni Protest movement as a whole and made it easier 
for Maliki to label the entire movement as radical and violent. Secondly, it made it impossible 
for third parties to support the Sunni Protest movement, even though there were outside forces 
that were sympathetic to their cause.  
 
Thirdly, the radical flank was able to radicalise the entire movement to some degree, by 
redefining normality and acceptable means for the protesters. However, even though the 
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entire movement is radicalised, extreme groups did not become dominant in the Sunni Protest 
movement as a whole. Radical groups controlled the Fallujah protest site, but because the 
Ramadi site is a lot bigger, the largest part of the Sunni Protest movement remained moderate 
(Sowell interview by Musings on Iraq, 2013). 
 
On the positive side, the radical flank made it impossible for Maliki to ignore the grievances 
and demands of the protesters, as the violent actions of the Military Council gained a lot of 
media attention. This contributed to pressuring Maliki into negotiations with the movement, 
mainly the moderate SMO, the Anbar Coordination Committee. 
 
The Anbar Coordination Committee 
The radical flank in Fallujah affects the Anbar Coordination Committee positively by making 
the Committee come off as more reasonable and moderate, even though it has been 
radicalised. When it seems like the most moderate SMO in the Sunni Protest movement, the 
Committee becomes a more attractive negotiations partner and its bargaining position with 
Maliki is strengthened. However, when the moderates entered negotiations throughout 2013, 
they are portrayed as traitors by the Military Council, thus increasing the distance between the 
two SMOs.  
 
Maliki’s	actions	
Because the dominant SMOs in Fallujah and Ramadi were different, then events and 
government actions were framed and resonated differently in the two cities. Maliki did also in 
some cases treat the cities different. First, I will look at what he did to the Sunni Protest 
movement and how his framing and actions affected the two SMOs. Secondly, I will look at 
how he treated the cities differently. 
 
Throughout the demonstrations, Maliki claimed that the Sunni Protest movement consisted of 
terrorists, Baathists and al-Qaida supporters who were only trying to destabilise Iraq 
(Gartenstein-Ross and Jensen, 2015). Some argue that Maliki wanted to label the protesters 
al-Qaida or ISIS in order to legitimise his own war on terror and strengthen his position 
(International Crisis Group, 2014).  
 
The effect of Maliki’s frames was different in Ramadi and Fallujah. In Ramadi, these frames 
did not resonate well with the majority of the population and the Coordination Committee did 
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not actively try to strengthen the frames. However, it did contribute to radicalise the city to 
some degree because it strengthened the extreme elements. These were marginal, but still 
present. In Fallujah, however, Maliki’s framing fit perfectly to the existing frames: Maliki 
called them terrorists so that he could use indiscriminate violence against the city. This 
amplified the existing frames, strengthened the Military Council and radicalised the 
population in Fallujah. 
 
Events	
The violence in Hawija on April 23 caused several groups to call for the Sunni to take up 
arms against the government. The extreme framing had some resonance in Ramadi, because 
the event was so clearly a violation on Maliki’s part. Even though there was radical rhetoric in 
the protest site, it did not spark violent actions. Since the moderate structures dominated, the 
more extreme elements were unable to persuade the rest of the movement to take a more 
extreme path. However, even though the moderate frames of the dominant structures 
prevailed, the violence in Hawija clearly contributed to the radicalisation of Ramadi (Sowell, 
2014). In Fallujah, this violence fit very well into the dominating worldview and created 
mobilisation and further radicalisation. Additionally, the JRTN, who also was central in 
provoking the incident, actively framed the event to mobilise and recruit followers. 
 
The Hawija incident caused the cities to react differently, while the move on the protest sites 
caused a quite similar reaction in both cities. This is an indication of how an event, when not 
being observed directly, is interpreted as well as being the subject of active framing by 
groups. In turn, how well the frame resonates or how well the event is framed is central in 
deciding how the groups react. In Ramadi, the Hawija incident resonated to some degree, but 
as the main structures were moderate, no violent action was taken. The groups in Fallujah 
reacted quite differently, and set about a wave of bombings as a result, as well as strong 
jihadist and anti-Shia rhetoric in the protest site. 
 
The violent bulldozing of the protest site in Ramadi on December 30 2013 caused violent 
clashes between the protesters and the ISF. This happened despite the fact that the city was 
relatively moderate and the Coordination Committee interested in working within the political 
process. The same violent approach against the protest site in Fallujah caused violent clashes 
with the protesters and the Military Council. It is not surprising that violent bulldozing of a 
protest site was met with violence from the protesters. However, it is an indication of just how 
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important the actions of the GOI was in this conflict. This is further underlined when ISF 
returned to Ramadi and Fallujah, using very different approaches.  
 
When the ISF returned to Ramadi in the early days of January, they were welcomed into the 
city and cooperated with the Anbar Coordination Committee in fighting the radical elements 
that had taken to the streets with weapons. This confirmed and amplified the moderate frames 
in Ramadi and mobilised the population in support of the Coordination Committee and ISF. 
However, it is unclear whether ISF used a relatively careful approach when they returned 
because they knew the city was moderate, or if the Coordination Committee let ISF back into 
the city because the ISF refrained from using heavy-handed tactics against the city. It was 
possibly a combination, as framing goes both ways. The different groups had an 
understanding of what the other group was like, and acted accordingly. This became very 
clear in Fallujah. 
 
When ISF tried to return to Fallujah, they were blocked by gunmen and forced to withdraw. 
Next, they surrounded the city and besieged it, in an attempt to isolate what they labelled 
terrorists. Shortly after, they proceeded to fire artillery shells into the city, killing several 
people. This approach was the ultimate confirmation of the dominating frames in Fallujah. 
ISF is only interested in destroying the city and killing the Sunni. This mobilised the 
population and radicalised the city. Like in Ramadi, it is unclear if the approach of the ISF 
was a result of their expectations of how the terrorists in the radicalised city would react to 
their presence. That the Military Council was irreconcilable and that there was no point in 
trying to use moderate means. Or, if the city’s expectation of the ISF’s genocidal goal caused 
the Military Council to clash violently with the ISF as they were trying to return. It is clear, 
however, that the mobilising structures’ goals, means and active framing of events were 
central in creating opportunity and in deciding how opportunity was exploited. 
 
Conclusion		
The research question this study set out to answer was: why was ISIS able to enter Fallujah 
unopposed, while being rejected and defeated in Ramadi in January 2014? Through 
analysing the dynamics between mobilising structures, political opportunity and framing 
processes in Ramadi and Fallujah separately, and then doing a cross-case analysis, this study 
has shown that: 
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The internal competition of frames caused the social movement organisations in Ramadi and 
Fallujah to develop differently, thus they framed events differently and were more or less 
open to certain frames. Fallujah was more receptive to extremist frames, while moderate 
frames resonated best in Ramadi. State repression and violence confirmed the dominant and 
extreme frames in Fallujah perfectly. The repression also affected Ramadi negatively, but not 
as much as in Fallujah. 
 
The radical flank effect increased the difference in two ways. First, by affecting how the 
government handled the movement in general, which in turn was framed differently by the 
SMOs. The GOI’s violent handling of Hawija and the protest site fit perfectly in the extremist 
worldview, while not so much with the moderates. Secondly, how the government handled 
the SMOs specifically. The approach in Fallujah was much more heavy-handed than in 
Ramadi, thus confirming and amplifying existing frames, in addition to the groups’ own 
active framing. This strengthened the extremists at the expense of moderates in Fallujah, and 
the other way around in Ramadi. 
 
The continued strengthening of the two structures made them the dominant forces in their 
respective cities. They decided how to create political opportunity and how to exploit it once 
it appeared, and as the ISF pulled away from the cities, the Coordination Committee and the 
Military Council the inserted themselves as the governing bodies of Ramadi and Fallujah. 
Because the Coordination Committee had remained relatively moderate, and had the 
establishment of a Sunni region within the framework of the existing Iraqi state as its goal, it 
was not in its interest to cooperate with ISIS, thus siding with ISF in fighting the extremists. 
 
The Military Council and the city of Fallujah, on the other hand, had been increasingly 
radicalised throughout the year, and as the goal was to destroy the government of Iraq and 
create a now political order, cooperating with ISIS was not a problem. The Military Council 
let ISIS into the city, and that is why ISIS was able to enter Fallujah unopposed in January 
2014.  
 
However, ISIS did not immediately take control of the city, as stated by Stern and Berger 
(2016), Fishman (2016) and Cockburn (2015, 2016). They continued to work within the 
framework of the Military Council, which, as described earlier, was a coalition of groups. 
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Over time, ISIS was able to become the dominant group in the Military Council and take 




One suggestion for further research is to use social movement theory to analyse how ISIS 
became the dominant group within the Military Council in Fallujah. I would do this by 
analysing ISIS as an SMO within the context of the Military Council as a movement from 
early 2014 to ISIS has complete control of the city in March-June the same year. I believe 
many of the same dynamics that radicalises the Sunni Protest movement are relevant in 
Fallujah, and that ISIS as the most extreme group is able to become the dominant group 
because of their radical framing, their ability to mobilise resources from outside Fallujah and 
Maliki’s continuation of shelling and indiscriminate attacks against Fallujah.  
 
Initially I looked at this study as two cases where an external force, ISIS, attacks or moves 
against two different cities. Then, I thought that by looking at political opportunity, 
mobilising structures and ISIS framing, I would be able to explain why Fallujah did not fight 
against ISIS while Ramadi did. However, through this study it has become increasingly clear 
that this approach was not very suited to explain the differences and that I had made the same 
mistake I have criticised others for; a group centric approach with too little focus on the 
context. For further analysis of the rise of ISIS, I recommend paying more attention to the 
environment that shaped ISIS and the groups that are less known, but possibly central in 



















12 Map generated at Scribble maps (2017)  
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